Memorandum from Fontainebleau. Program of the Powers at the Peace Conference

The program of the powers at the peace conference.

"Document from Fontainebleau" (pp. 150-153)

On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George sent Clemenceau and Wilson a memorandum from the dacha where he usually spent the weekend, entitled "Some remarks for the peace conference before the drafting of the final peace terms." This memorandum is known as the Fontainebleau Document. It outlined the English program and at the same time criticized the French demands. “You can deprive Germany of her colonies,” wrote Lloyd George, “bring her army to the size of a police force and her fleet to the level of the fleet of a power of the fifth rank. Ultimately, it makes no difference: if she finds the peace treaty of 1919 unjust, she will find means to take revenge on the victors ... For these reasons, I strongly object to the rejection of [p. 150] Germany of the German population in favor of other nations to a greater extent than necessary".

The British Prime Minister did not remain in debt. Since France thinks that the British proposals are only acceptable to the naval powers, he, Lloyd George, will take them back.

“I was under the illusion,” continued the British Prime Minister, “that France attaches importance to colonies, ships, compensation, disarmament, Syria and the British guarantee to help France with all her might if she is attacked. I regret my mistake and will make sure it doesn't happen again." In conclusion, Lloyd George announced that he was withdrawing his offer to provide France with the coal mines of the Saar.

David Lloyd George. The Truth about the Peace Treaties, vol. I.p. 420-421.

The correspondence of the prime ministers was handed over to the President of the United States. The meetings of the Council of Four began again. Wilson supported Lloyd George on the Saar issue. Having met with a united front of both powers, Clemenceau decided to change his demand: he offered to transfer the Saarland to the League of Nations, which in turn would give France a mandate for it for 15 years. After this period, a plebiscite will be held in the region, which will decide the question of the further fate of the Saar. But Clemenceau's proposal did not find support. Wilson agreed only to send experts to the Saar to find out whether it was possible to let France exploit the mines without political dominance in the Saar.

Wilson also spoke out against the secession of the Rhineland from Germany and even against its prolonged occupation by the French. In return, he promised, together with England, to guarantee the borders of France and to help her in the event of a German attack, although, as events showed, this promise had no real value.

The French delegation demanded the restriction of German military production and the establishment of international control over it. This was opposed by England and especially the United States. Germany should leave the army needed to "crush Bolshevism," Wilson said. The President also proposed to leave Germany all the weapons it had. His position reflected the interests of the US bourgeoisie, which sought to preserve German militarism, strengthen it and use it both to fight against Soviet Russia and [p. 152] to strengthen their European positions against English and French competitors. [p. 153]

The main focus of the first years of US foreign policy relations with Weimar Germany was the issue of settling the payment of German reparations. In order to understand the particular complexity of this problem, it is necessary to briefly explain the events that accompanied the conclusion of the Paris Peace Treaty with defeated Germany.

As you know, the main issues at the Versailles Peace Conference were decided by the so-called "Council of Ten" and "Council of Four". The "Council of Ten" consisted of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the five great powers, who had common interests at the conference. They were: from the United States - President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, from England - Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Balfour, from France - Prime Minister Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Pichon, from Italy - Prime Minister Orlando and Foreign Minister Baron Sonnino, for Japan, Baron Makino and Viscount Shinda. Other plenipotentiary delegates of the conference were present only at the plenary sessions of the conference, of which there were only seven in almost half a year of its work. For all that, Italy, although formally one of the winners, after the defeat at Caparetto, could not take an active position in the negotiations, and Japan had a narrow circle of its interests, mainly related to the division of the colonial heritage of the Second Reich. And therefore, in the issue of reparations and the conclusion of peace with Germany, the main role was played by the positions of three countries - Great Britain, France and the USA.

It should be noted that all three countries had their own special view on post-war settlement, which was, of course, directly related to the interests of these countries. Great Britain wanted to consolidate its status as a world leader at the conference. And for this it was necessary not only to legally confirm the defeat of Germany and make it impossible to actively include it in big European politics in the next few years, but also not to allow France to reign alone on the continent, creating a counterbalance to it in the form of the same Germany. Therefore, Lloyd George opposed the territorial dismemberment of Germany, but was not averse to taking most of its colonies, and also to divide the German fleet interned in the English bay of Scapa Flow, based on the principle of proportionality of the contribution made to the victory at sea. Do I need to clarify that the contribution of Great Britain allowed her to claim the lion's share of German ships. In addition, Lloyd George, during his election campaign in December 1918, clearly indicated his position on reparations, believing that "Germany must pay all British military expenses."

France took the most radical position. Perhaps, from some everyday point of view, this position can be understandable, but from the point of view of big politics, it initially looked unrealistic. France demanded the dismemberment of Germany, wanted to establish a border along the Rhine, demanded monstrous restrictions on Germany in terms of industry and the army, and a ban on the construction of the fleet. In addition, obviously mindful of the five billion indemnity paid to the Germans as a result of the war of 1870-1871, France counted on full compensation for damage: both military and civilian, and this damage, according to the French, was no less than 140 billion dollars. .

The United States arrived at the conference with the most thorough preparations. The program for the American delegates was the so-called "14 points of Wilson", the purpose of which was to obtain the US financial and political hegemony in the world. The situation was complicated by the ambiguous attitude towards Germany and the problem of peace within the United States itself, where there were two strong currents - "reintegrationists" and "punishers". The “reintegrationists” advocated the inclusion of a renewed democratized Germany in the new community of nations and feared that unnecessarily harsh peace conditions and excessive pressure would contribute to the coming to power of leftist forces in Germany. The "punishers" demanded that the struggle against the militaristic and expansionist circles of Germany, which unleashed a world slaughter with their behavior, be brought to an end. In the confrontation between the “reintegrationists” and the “punishers”, the position of big business played a significant role - if the former was supported by a group of young monopolies that united around President Wilson and did not have special financial interests in Europe, then the latter, led by the Morgan group, were interested in further weakening German competitors in European markets. Only the October Revolution in Russia and the November events of 1918 in Germany, which were very hostile in the United States, managed to provide some easing of contradictions in this area (Deputy Secretary of State Long wrote about the Kiel uprising: "This is the worst news in several months ...").

The careful preparation of the United States for a peace conference is confirmed by the fact that in late 1918 and early 1919 two special missions, Drezel and Gherardi, were sent to Germany to collect information. The main object of their study was the position of the Ebert-Scheidemann government, its support among the people, and the likelihood of a new revolutionary upsurge in the country. On the whole, the situation in Germany seemed to both Drezel and Gherardi quite satisfactory for the implementation of the American program.

What was included in this program? In most of its points it contradicted the position of Great Britain, and in almost all of its points, the position of France. A great success for American diplomacy was the creation of the League of Nations on the basis of the "14 points of Wilson" and the inclusion of "14 points" in the draft of the future peace treaty with Germany. France made an attempt to extend the truce with Germany for a new term in order to exclude certain clauses of the League of Nations charter from the text of the future final peace treaty, which ran into a tough rebuff from the United States. Even tougher Lansing opposed the "allied control" initiated by France through the military occupation of German enterprises in the area of ​​the Rhine-Westphalian coal basin. American General Bliss said that in conditions of extreme instability in Germany, any tightening of the terms of the peace treaty could lead to the strengthening of the revolutionary movement or right-wing militarists. Bliss's position was fully shared by President Wilson, who believed that the introduction of allied control would inevitably entail the need to bring an additional contingent of troops into Germany, which, firstly, would force the winners to incur additional financial expenses, and secondly, could become another factor in further to the left of Germany. True, under pressure from France, Wilson was forced to give guarantees that if Germany violated the terms of the peace treaty, he would not hesitate to start hostilities against them.

If on the issue of allied control American diplomacy managed to win, then in discussions on the reduction of the German army, success was not on its side. France proposed to reduce the German troops to 200 thousand people. General Bliss and the English Marshal Haig opposed, not wanting such a weakening of Germany. At the same time, Bliss said that "Germany needs to have an army of at least 400 thousand people." The situation changed with the return to the conference of Lloyd George, who traveled to London to report on the progress of negotiations before Parliament. Lloyd George spoke in the spirit that even 200 thousand people is too big a figure, since Germany in 10 years will be able to prepare an army of two million. Therefore, the British Prime Minister proposed to abolish compulsory military service in Germany. Clemenceau and Foch, sensing the changes in the situation, were able to push through the figure of 100,000. An outraged Bliss declared that "only to maintain internal order Germany needs 140,000.”

The decision on the future of the German navy and the fate of the captured German ships interned in the English harbor of Scapa Flow resulted in a real battle. The issues of the ratio of the fleets directly concerned the United States (in contrast to the issues of the same number of German troops), which intended to intercept the hegemony on the seas from Great Britain in the near future. As a result, it was decided to sink the German ships in the middle of the Atlantic Ocean. Several ships were handed over to France as a result of losses. Heated discussions unfolded around the second "Wilson point", concerning the "freedom of the seas". The British managed to freeze the operation of this clause and prevent it from being included in the charter of the League of Nations. But the sons of Foggy Albion failed to reach an agreement on the recognition of British superiority on the seas, or at least conclude an agreement on the equality of the British and American fleets.

Another success of the United States was the reduction in the number of occupying Allied forces in the Rhineland. It was also possible to reject the harassment of England, which wanted to get the commercial secrets of the German chemical industry by establishing control over the German chemical industry (with the motivation that it was the development of the German chemical industry that was responsible for the manufacture and introduction of poisonous substances such as mustard gas in the army). The American delegation also spoke out against the destruction of the German military bases in Helgoland and Dune.

I would also like to note that the constantly seeping into the press reports of growing disagreements between the United States and the allies contributed to the growth of popular discontent in Germany. The Germans quite reasonably feared that they were going to be enslaved by an unfair treaty. The realization of this circumstance prompted the allies to some consolidation, based on the desire to make peace as soon as possible. In the famous "Memorandum from Fontainebleau" Lloyd George demanded a speedy conclusion of peace to resolve the Bolshevik question. Wilson argued that long negotiations could lead to the weakening and fall of the already weakly supported German government.

One of the key issues of the Paris Peace Conference was the question of reparations. None of the Entente countries denied the need to levy reparations from defeated Germany. The need for reparations, in fact, was stipulated in the text of the Versailles Peace Treaty, where it was said that Germany bears all responsibility for unleashing a world war. However, the approaches to the issue of reparations in the countries of the "big three" (Great Britain, the USA, France) were different.

Different positions of the countries were determined by their current political situation. If the United States, following the results of the First World War, managed to break out into world leaders without suffering serious material damage and, in addition, becoming a creditor to the European powers, then England and France faced the problem of the need to pay off their debt to the United States as soon as possible. They placed special hopes in this matter on German reparations. In addition, in French considerations on this score, a significant role was played by the desire to get even for the 5,000,000,000th indemnity in 1871. The British also wanted to weaken Germany and improve its financial condition at its expense, but Lloyd George was reasonably afraid of Germany turning to the left. He said: “We are pushing Germany into the arms of the Bolsheviks. In addition, in order for it to be able to pay what we want and what justice requires, it is necessary that it occupy an even more significant place in the markets than it did before the war. Is it in our interest?" . In addition, Lloyd George, willy-nilly, was obliged to fulfill his campaign promises, the leitmotif of which was the phrase "the Germans will pay everything to the last farthing."

Italy and Japan, who had no special strategic interests in the question of reparations, joined Britain and France, hoping, at worst, to get some significant amount of money from defeated Germany.

In the United States, there was also no unified view on the question of reparations at first. The essence of the contradictions between the two groups - "reintegrationists" and "punishers" has already been described above. In the end, the reintegrationists won the upper hand - Wilson joined them, frightened by the possibility of the Bolshevization of Germany. Therefore, the goal of the United States was to prevent the plunder of Germany by the Allies. Even at the preparatory stage for the conference, Wilson proclaimed the thesis that reparations should be calculated based not on the military costs of the allies, but on the basis of damage to the civilian population. The Americans created a special commission to determine the solvency of the defeated Germany. On December 12, 1918, the so-called “Kraves Memorandum” was published, which emphasized: “... Only a prosperous Germany will be able to make compensation annually for a long period ... The Allies should limit the amount of reparations to a reasonable amount ... Reparations should be based on the principle of compensation, and not punishment."

On January 23, 1919, at a meeting of the "Council of Ten", a special commission on reparations was created, which included W. McCormick, B. Baruch, T. Lamont and N. Davis from the USA. Within the framework of the meetings of this commission, disputes immediately began over the categories of losses that the German side should compensate the winners. On February 14, Dulles proposed that, when calculating reparations, Germany's ability to pay should be taken into account in the first place. Wilson, on the other hand, resorted to a cunning political move, threatening to make public the very fact of the contradictions between the allies, which could play into the hands of the Germans. This affected the British and French - they agreed to consider as subject to reparations only those compensations that the Germans had to pay for damage to civilians and property. True, Britain and France soon struck back by passing the decision that Germany was obliged to pay a regular pension to all the wounded and the families of the dead. This immediately raised the estimated size of reparations by 2 times. After a stubborn struggle, the US was forced to approve this Allied demand, and difficult negotiations began over a specific amount of reparations. The United States offered an amount of 15-20 billion dollars. Britain stood for 120 billion, but the French demanded 200. Upon learning of the French demand, Lloyd George spoke unambiguously: “French demands are absurd. I don't agree with them. I will fight to make the demands reasonable.” For all the fantasticness of their demands, the French also dragged out negotiations on the exact figure in every possible way, hoping in the future to come up with more and more new payments for Germany. At the same time, France referred to the fact that only the United States, with the help of the McKinstry commission, managed to establish Germany's solvency for itself, and therefore could impose its figures on the allies.

As a result, the Paris Peace Conference failed to resolve the issue of German reparations. Even the US retreat did not help: the Americans offered reparations of 30 billion, on the condition that the Germans would not pay more than five for the first two years. The only decision taken was the decision to reimburse until May 1, 1921 the amount of all Belgian military expenses. And all steel issues were transferred to the jurisdiction of the reparation commission.

Negotiations on the timing of the payment of reparations also turned out to be a failure for the United States. The Americans were in favor of setting a fixed date for the end of payments, in order to limit France's claims to constantly invent new leads and increase the payment period. The French declared the idea that the Germans were obliged to pay until they paid the required amount in full. Britain supported France, it was decided to pay compensation within 30 years, but in case of non-payment on time, the Germans were obliged to continue payments.

So, the result of the activities of the "Inquiries" at the Versailles Peace Conference was their defeat in matters related to Germany. General House was sure that the terms of the peace treaty imposed on Germany would certainly lead to a new war, and wrote in those days: “... US participation in it would be the worst action. I want us to get out of here as soon as possible and leave them to themselves ... ". The Germans also perfectly understood the whole conjuncture of the negotiations. The German military leader General von Seeckt said: “The position of Germany can become the key that, at the moment of the country’s weakness due to the dictates of the Treaty of Versailles, will still allow the country to maintain both a completely loyal position towards the Entente and Russia, and complete freedom of action in the future” .

On June 28, 1919, a peace treaty with Germany was signed in the Hall of Mirrors at the Palace of Versailles. The treaty was signed by all the allied powers, except China (which did not agree with the envisaged transfer of Shandong province to Japan). Germany lost Alsace and Lorraine, bordering France, and a 15-year control of the League of Nations was introduced in the mineral-rich Saar region with the condition that a plebiscite on national and state affiliation be held here in the future. The Rhine zone was declared demilitarized, a regime of 15-year occupation by the forces of the League of Nations was introduced there (mostly French troops, abounding in blacks, which further fueled racist sentiments in German society). Eupen and Malmedy districts were transferred to Belgium, Denmark received the northern part of Schleswig. Danzig and Memel (Gdansk and Klaipeda) were transferred under the control of the League of Nations.

The Treaty of Versailles limited the size of the German army to 100 thousand people, abolished and prohibited the introduction of compulsory military service, and also deprived Germany of the right to create military aviation, tank units and a submarine fleet. The German navy was subject to restrictions, and the General Staff and the Military Academy were dissolved.

As for the results of the activities of the reparation commission, the point of view of Great Britain and France eventually prevailed. Until May 1, 1921, Germany had to pay reparations in the amount of 10 billion marks in gold, securities, goods, sea and river vessels. The total amount of reparations, despite the counterproposal of Germany to limit it to 100 billion marks, amounted to 152 billion, of which 132 billion were to be paid over the next 30 years. already held in next year the conference at Spa fixed the percentage to be received by each country directly at war with Germany, namely: France - 52%, England - 22%, Italy - 10%, Belgium - 8%, Japan and Portugal - 0.75% each, the remaining 6.5% were distributed among Yugoslavia, Romania, Greece and other allied countries.

The final terms of the Versailles Peace Treaty marked the defeat of American diplomacy in the negotiations. At the same time, it should be remembered that there was already quite a serious opposition inside the country to President Wilson and the reintegrationist movement led by him. Many did not understand why the prosperous United States should be bogged down in constantly unstable European affairs, if you can continue the good old course of self-isolation. The main exponent of isolationist ideas was the Republican Party of the United States. She was especially annoyed by the proposed Charter of the League of Nations, proposed by Wilson for ratification by the US Congress. Wilson was reproached for the fact that the Charter of the League of Nations not only does not subordinate this organization to the American Congress, but, on the contrary, places certain restrictions on the Congress in matters of foreign policy. Article 10 of the treaty, which stipulated the adoption of collective measures in the event of a threat of aggression, aroused great dissatisfaction among congressmen. League opponents called this condition "a threat to the entire Monroe Doctrine".

A tense discussion in Congress about the Treaty of Versailles began on July 10, 1919, and continued for more than eight months. After the introduction of 48 amendments and 4 reservations by the Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, such serious changes were made to the treaty that they actually began to contradict the agreements reached in Paris. But even this did not save the case. On March 19, 1920, the resolution on the ratification of the Treaty of Versailles, with all the amendments made to it, was rejected by the Senate. Accordingly, the "reinsurance" and "cross" treaty between the United States and France, signed at Versailles, could not come into force. Consequently, the treaty between France and Great Britain could not enter into force. This was a major blow to European security.

W. Wilson suffered a serious defeat in one of his most important undertakings. The United States, which was turning into the strongest country in the world, found itself legally and in many respects actually outside the Versailles order. This circumstance could not but affect the prospects for international development.

FROM THE SPEECH OF THE PRIME MINISTER OF FRANCE JE. CLEMENCEAU

January 1919

Sir Robert Borden, Canada's first delegate, chided the Great Powers quite amicably for having already made up their minds. Yes, we have made a decision regarding the commissions, just as we have taken it regarding the convening of this conference, as we have adopted it regarding the convening of the representatives of the countries concerned.

I make no secret of this: there is a conference of great powers, and it is sitting in the next room. The five Great Powers, on whose actions they now wish to receive an account, are in a position to submit this report.

The Prime Minister of Great Britain has just reminded me that on the day of the cessation of hostilities, the main Allies had 12 million soldiers in their active armies - this is our right and foundation.

Our losses in killed and wounded are in the millions, if we had not stood before our eyes big question about the League of Nations, it is possible that we selfishly decided to discuss all issues among ourselves. Who could say that we would not have the right to do so?

But we didn't want that. We have convened the interested nations in full force. We called them together not to dictate our will to them, not to force them to do what they do not want to do, but so that they would render us their assistance.

Tardieu A. Mir. S. 87.

FROM THE RESOLUTION OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

January 1919

1. In order to maintain the peace of the world, for the sake of which the united states have now gathered, it is necessary to create a League of Nations, which would promote international cooperation would ensure the fulfillment of accepted international obligations and create guarantees against war.

2. This League must be formed as an inseparable part of the general peace treaty and must be open to all civilized states which may be relied upon to further the aims of the League.

3. The members of the League shall meet periodically at international conferences and shall have a permanent organization and secretariat to conduct the affairs of the League between conferences.

Accordingly, the (Paris) Conference appoints a commission representing the united governments to work out in detail the constitution and functions of the League.

Archive of Colonel House. T. 4. S. 227.

FROM THE RESOLUTION ON MANDATES PROPOSED BY GENERAL SMETS

January 1919

1. In view of the material on the German administration of the colonies formerly part of the German Empire, and of the threat to the freedom and security of all states which the German possession of submarine bases in many parts of the world inevitably poses, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that under no circumstances under circumstances, no German colony should be returned to Germany.

2. For similar reasons, and especially in consequence of the historical oppression by the Turks of all subject peoples and the terrible massacre of Armenians and other peoples in recent years, the Allied and Associated Powers agree that Armenia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Palestine and Arabia should be completely separated from the Turkish Empire.

3. The Allied and Associated Powers agree that the opportunity afforded by the necessity of disposing of these colonies and territories, formerly belonging to Germany and Turkey and populated by peoples not yet able to exist independently in the stressful conditions of the present, should be used to apply to these territories the principle that that the welfare and development of such peoples constitute the sacred guardianship of civilization, and that the guarantees for the exercise of this guardianship must be expressed in the constitution of the League of Nations.

4. After careful study, the Allied and Associated Powers recognize that best method The practical application of this principle must be the entrustment of the guardianship of such peoples to the advanced nations which, by virtue of their resources, their experience or their geographical position, are best able to assume this responsibility, and that this guardianship should be carried out by them as Mandators of the League of Nations.

5. The Allied and Associated Powers consider that the nature of the mandate should vary according to the stage of development of the people, the geographical location of the territory, economic conditions, and the like.

Archive of Colonel House. T. 4. S. 248.

FROM THE SPEECH OF US PRESIDENT W. WILSON
AT THE PLENARY SESSION OF THE CONFERENCE

February 1919

I am glad that I can present to you the unanimous report of the representatives of the fourteen nations... Something living has been born... The Regulations on the League of Nations are elastic and contain only general principles, but they are resolute and categorical in one thing, in which we too must be resolute and categorical. It is a decisive, definitive guarantee of peace, a decisive guarantee of a treaty against aggression...

Armed influence is relegated to the background in this project, but it exists in the background, and if the moral authority of the world turns out to be insufficient, physical force will emerge from there. But she is our last refuge, for this alliance is an instrument of peace, not of war...

This alliance is conceived not only as a guarantee of peace among people. It is rather an alliance of cooperation in all matters of an international character.

Becker S. Woodrow Wilson. World War.
Versailles world. M.-Pg., 1923. pp.306-307

FROM THE FRENCH DRAFT AGREEMENT
ON THE WESTERN BORDER OF GERMANY

March 1919

I. In the interests of world peace and in order to ensure the implementation of the basic conditions of the League of Nations, the western border of Germany is established along the Rhine. In this regard, Germany renounces all sovereignty over the territories of the former German Empire located on the left bank of the Rhine, as well as any customs union with these territories.

II. The line of the Rhine will be occupied by virtue of a League of Nations mandate by an Allied military force. The limits and conditions for the occupation on German territory of the bridgeheads of Kiel, Mannheim, Mainz, Koblenz, Cologne and Düsseldorf, necessary for the security of the inter-Allied forces, will be determined by the final peace treaty. Until the signing of the said treaty, the provisions fixed on this subject of the truce of November 11, 1918 remain in force.
In the 50-kilometer zone east of its western border, Germany can neither maintain nor build fortifications.

III. On the territory of the left bank of the Rhine (with the exception of Alsace-Lorraine) one or more independent states under the protectorate of the League of Nations will be created. Their western and southern borders are established by a peace treaty. Germany undertakes not to do anything that could prevent the said state or states from fulfilling the obligations or enjoying the rights arising from the causes and conditions for the emergence of these states.

Tardieu A. Mir. P.149

FROM THE MEMORANDUM
GREAT BRITAIN PRIME MINISTER D.LLOYD GEORGE
("MEMORANDUM FROM FONTAINBLAU")

March 1919

You can take her colonies from Germany, reduce her armies to the size of an ordinary police force, and her fleet to the level of a power of the fifth rank. Ultimately, it's all the same: if in time she feels that she was treated unfairly at the conclusion of peace in 1919, she will find means to take revenge on her winners ...

For allies to be satisfied, their conditions must be strict; they can be harsh and even ruthless, but at the same time they can be so fair that the country to which we present them feels that it has no right to complain. But we will never be forgiven and will not forget manifestations of injustice and arrogance in the hour of victory.

For these reasons, I strongly object to separating from Germany even more than necessary numbers of Germans and placing them under the administration of some other country ...

A [peace] settlement should have three goals: first, to pay tribute to the allies, given that Germany is the culprit of this war and is responsible for the methods that were used in this war. Secondly, it must be a settlement that the responsible German government can sign in the firm belief that it will be able to fulfill all the obligations associated with it. Thirdly, it must be such a settlement that will not include any reasons for the outbreak of future wars and will be an alternative to Bolshevism, since it will appear before all reasonable people as a just solution to the European problem.

A very essential part of the peace agreement should be ... the creation of the League of Nations as an effective defender of international law and international freedom throughout the world ... The League of Nations will be able to fulfill its duty to the whole world only if the members of the League themselves trust it and if there is no suspicion, rivalry and envy between themselves on the issue of armaments.

Lloyd George D. The Truth About peace treaties.
In 2 volumes. M., 1957. T. 1. S. 348-352.

2. Paris Conference (January 18 - June 28, 1919)

Organization of the conference

In total, more than a thousand delegates attended the conference. They were accompanied by a huge number of employees: scientific experts - historians, lawyers, statisticians, economists, geologists, geographers, etc. - translators, secretaries, stenographers, typists and even soldiers. Wilson brought guards with him from America, as did Lloyd George from London. The number of employees serving the delegation reached 1,300 among the Americans. The maintenance of the American mission cost 1.5 million dollars. There were more than 150 journalists officially registered at the conference, not counting the endless number of reporters and interviewers circling around the hotels occupied by delegations.

In addition to official delegates, representatives of a number of colonial countries, small powers, newly created states, public organizations. Noisy Paris, quite accustomed to a large influx of visitors, lived for several months in the interests of a peace conference.

On January 12, the first business meeting of prime ministers, foreign ministers and plenipotentiary delegates of the five main powers took place at the Caie d'Orsay. The presiding French Foreign Minister Pichon invited those present to discuss the order of the conference.

The question immediately arose about the language of the conference, the protocols and future texts of the peace treaty. Clemenceau stated that until now all diplomats had used French; there is no reason to change this custom, especially if you remember "what France has experienced." Lloyd George suggested using English as well, because half the world speaks that language; it must also be taken into account that the United States is acting in Europe for the first time in the diplomatic field. The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Sonniio, who, by the way, spoke impeccable French, said that the French proposal was an insult to Italy. If one takes into account what France has experienced, then one should not forget that Italy sent 4 to 5 million soldiers to the front, said Sonnino, insisting on the admission of the Italian language. "A bad start for the future union of nations," Clemenceau grumbled angrily. In the end, English and French were recognized as standard languages.

Having settled the question of the language, we began to discuss the rules of the conference. This presented great difficulties, because all 27 nations insisted on their participation in debates, meetings and decisions. They looked for precedents in history, recalled the organization of the Congress of Vienna, discussed whether it was possible to take its "commission of four" or "eight" as a model, etc.

Clemenceau insisted that the opinions of the great powers should be taken into account first.

“Up to now I have constantly held the opinion that there is an agreement between us,” said Clemenceau, “by virtue of which the five great powers themselves resolve important questions before they enter the conference room.

In the event of a new war, Germany will throw all her armies not on Cuba or Honduras, but on France; France will again respond. Therefore, I demand that we stick to the accepted proposal; it boils down to the fact that meetings of representatives of the five named great powers take place and, thus, a resolution is reached important issues. Discussion of secondary issues should be left to the commissions and committees before the meeting of the conference" 1 .

1 (Becker, Woodrow Wilson. World War. Peace of Versailles, STR. 204-205.)

On the other hand, the English dominions demanded to be treated as independent states. "We are as important as Portugal," said the Canadian delegates. Wilson objected to the discussion of issues in a close circle. England did not oppose Clemenceau's proposal, but insisted on giving the small nations the opportunity to take part in the work of the conference.

After a lengthy discussion, the French draft drawn up by Vertelo was adopted. All countries represented at the conference were divided into four categories. The first included the belligerent powers "having common interests" - the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. These countries will participate in all meetings and commissions. The second category are warring powers "having private interests" - Belgium, Brazil, British dominions and India, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Gejas, Honduras, China, Cuba, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia , Siam, Czechoslovak Republic. They will participate in those meetings at which issues concerning them are discussed. The third category includes the powers that are in a state of severing diplomatic relations with the German bloc - Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay. Their delegations participate in meetings if issues concerning them are discussed. Finally, the fourth category consists of neutral powers and states in the process of formation. They may speak either orally or in writing when they are invited by one of the five major Powers having common interests, and only to meetings devoted specifically to the consideration of questions directly concerning them. Moreover, the regulations emphasized, "only insofar as these issues are raised." Neither Germany nor its allies were mentioned in the regulations.

The representation between the countries was distributed as follows: the USA, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan sent 5 plenipotentiary delegates to the peace conference; Belgium, Brazil and Serbia - 3 each; China, Greece, Gejas, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam and the Czechoslovak Republic - 2 each; the British dominions (Australia, Canada, South Africa) and India were represented by 2 delegates, New Zealand - by one delegate. All other countries received the right to send one delegate each. It was specifically stipulated that "the conditions for the representation of Russia will be established by the conference when the cases concerning Russia are considered."

According to the regulations, the President of the French Republic was to open the peace conference. Following this, the head of the French Council of Ministers was to preside temporarily. A secretariat was set up to edit the protocols, with one representative from each of the five main countries. Further, the maintenance of protocols, the storage of documents, who and how has the right to submit petitions, was carefully provided for. But later all this careful regulation was violated. One meeting followed another. Soon everyone was confused about which meeting was official and which was a private meeting. It is hardly possible to name another such disorderly conference in the history of diplomacy as the Paris one: its most important meetings were left completely without protocols and even without secretarial notes. When Clemenceau, who was up to his neck in these endless meetings, was told about this, he muttered: "To hell with the protocols ...".

In essence, the division of countries into categories and the distribution of mandates between countries already predetermined the nature of the work of the conference. Initially, everything was concentrated in the Council of Ten, which consisted of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the five great powers. They were: from the USA - President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, from France - Prime Minister Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Pichon, from England - Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Balfour, from Italy - Prime Minister Orlando and Minister Foreign Affairs Baron Sonnino, from Japan - Baron Makino and Viscount Shinda. The remaining delegates of the conference were present only at the plenary sessions of the conference, of which there were only seven in almost half a year of its work.

The regulation has been approved. They were about to close the meeting, when suddenly Marshal Foch demanded to speak. Regardless of the fact that the conference was quite numerous, Foch openly proposed organizing a campaign against the Bolsheviks. In the hands of the marshal was Paderevsky's message about the occupation of Vilna by the Bolsheviks. Marshal insisted on the transfer of troops to the Danzig-Thorn region: this explains why Foch, when discussing the extension of the armistice with Germany, demanded the passage of troops through Danzig. The core of the troops intended for the expedition were to be the US Army. "They show an even greater cheerfulness," Foch explained his proposal. The marshal's proposal had a threefold purpose: it provided assistance to the French ally - Poland, on the other hand, connected the United States with the interests of France, and, finally, removed American troops from France.

Wilson was not averse to implementing his plan to fight the Bolsheviks, but in this form the proposal of the marshal did not eliminate him. The president spoke out against the marshal's idea. Lloyd George also declined to discuss the proposal. Under such conditions, Clemenceau had no choice but to abandon the marshal's plan, and Pnshon even made a proposal "that the meetings continue without the participation of the military, who should retire" 1 .

1 (Nowak, Versailles, p. 40.)

Conference opening

The conference, which was to present the peace treaty of Germany, opened on the same day, January 18, and in the same hall of mirrors at Versailles, where the creation of the German Empire was proclaimed 48 years ago. In a grand speech at the opening of the meeting, President Poincaré demanded sanctions against the perpetrators of the war and guarantees against new aggression. Recalling that the German Empire was proclaimed in the meeting hall at one time, seizing two French provinces, Poincaré said:

"Through the fault of her founders, she was vicious in her very origin. She kept the germ of death in herself. Born in injustice, she ended her existence in dishonor" 2 .

2 ("Le Monde Diplomatique et Economique", Juin, 1919, no. 2, p. 6.)

The attack was directed, one might say, directly on the forehead: France, in the person of Poincaré, immediately put forward a program for the dismemberment of Germany. But other delegates big countries did not support the French position: they had their own plans. Wilsoy recommended that the question of the League of Nations be considered first. He made his proposal after the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 12th. Several times later Wilson returned to the League of Nations. The rest of the Council of Ten hesitated. They were afraid that the adoption of the charter of the League of Nations might complicate the subsequent decision of the territorial and financial problems. So before the plenum the question of the League of Nations was not decided.

The plenum of the peace conference approved the rules of work, elected Clemenceau as president, and Lansing, Lloyd George, Orlando and Saionji as vice-presidents of the conference.

Four days after the plenum there were lengthy discussions in the Council of Ten. Wilson insisted that the charter of the League of Nations and the peace treaty should form a single and inseparable whole, binding on all. Lloyd George agreed only to the inclusion of the Charter of the League of Nations in the peace treaty. The French proposed not to link the League of Nations with the peace treaty. In the English proposal, in a disguised form, and in the French more explicitly, the League of Nations was somehow or other separated from the peace treaty. Finally, they decided to refer the question of the League of Nations to a special commission. By referring the question of the League of Nations to a commission, the diplomats of France and England hoped to remove it from the agenda for a long time to come. Moreover, they tried to make the commission as cumbersome as possible in order to delay its work. The French and British proposed to include representatives of small nations in the commission. In vain Wilson insisted on the creation of a small commission. In response, Lloyd George repeated: since the League of Nations should become a shield of small peoples, they must be admitted to the commission. Clemenceau assured that the great powers would prove their readiness to cooperate with the small nations if they opened the doors of the commission to them. So insistently they included in the commission representatives of small peoples, who were so scornfully not allowed to take part in the actual work of the peace conference.

Wilson understood that they wanted to impede the work of the commission in every possible way, and for his part made a diplomatic move. The President announced that he was taking over the chairmanship of the commission. It has been called the "Hotel Crillon Commission".

On January 25, at the plenary session of the conference, Wilson stated his thesis: the League of Nations should be an integral part of the entire peace treaty. The Peace Conference accepted Wilson's proposal. The President is engrossed in the work of the Crillon Hotel Commission.

Having got rid of the question of the League of Nations for the time being, the conference participants decided to move on to other problems. "Eastern and colonial questions are less complicated," Lloyd George assured, offering to discuss the fate of the colonies taken from Germany, and at the same time Turkish possessions.

This was supported primarily by the British dominions, who all the time demanded an immediate division of the colonies. The representative of New Zealand has explicitly stated that he is an enthusiastic fan of the League of Nations. However, fearing to "overburden" it, he recommended first dividing the colonies, and then giving full control to the League of Nations. Even the day before, Japan, in preliminary negotiations, also expressed its consent to raising the question of colonies. Italian Prime Minister Orlando did not mind. Lloyd George could thus hope to accept his offer. However, he was mistaken: the colonial question was not at all easy. Everyone agreed that the colonies should not be returned to Germany. Wilson noted this unanimity, declaring: "Everyone is against the return of the German colonies." But what to do with them? This issue has caused controversy. Each of major countries immediately presented her long-thought-out claims. France demanded the division of Togo and Cameroon. Japan hoped to secure the Shandong Peninsula and the German islands in the Pacific. Italy also spoke of its colonial interests. The French hinted that the Treaties concluded during the war had already resolved a number of issues. Everyone understood that there are secret agreements between countries. That which had been hidden so carefully broke through.

With this turn of affairs, the League of Nations was already on the sidelines. Meanwhile, for Wilson the question of the League of Nations was above all a matter of his personal honor. Although the president himself, according to his historiographer Becker, did not own a single idea - all were borrowed from others - the president nevertheless worked hard to create a charter, and the whole world associated the League of Nations with the name of Wilson. The masses are tired of the war. They did not want to hear about new military hardships. Peace was demanded in all countries, in all sections of the population. A pacifist wave has swept over the peoples. Entire libraries have been written about the League of Nations. Pacifist elements sowed peaceful illusions among the broad masses. The League of Nations was seen as the only guarantee of peace. When Wilson got off the ship in Brest, he saw a huge banner, where it was written: "Glory to Wilson the Just!". It was extremely difficult to get around the League of Nations in such a state of mind. To give in on the question of the League of Nations meant for Wilson to lose all his halo. But, of course, it was not so much a matter of Wilson's personal prestige. The League of Nations was to be the vehicle by which America could obtain the billions it had lent to Europe. The League of Nations could become America's leverage in Europe. Wilson therefore forced the conference again to turn to the question of the League of Nations. "The world will say that the great powers first divided the defenseless parts of the world, and then created an alliance of peoples," 1 said Wilson.

1 (Becker, Woodrow Wilson. World War. Peace of Versailles, p. 288.)

The President insisted that the issue of German colonies and Turkish territory occupied by the Allies be resolved within the framework of the League of Nations. He suggested that the guardianship of these territories should be entrusted to the advanced nations who were willing and able, by their experience and geographical position, to assume such responsibility; Wilson proposed to carry out this guardianship on the basis of the mandates of the League of Nations. All members of the Council of Ten opposed the principle of mandates. Lloyd George put forward the demand of the English dominions - to consider the territories occupied by them during the war, conquered and included in the corresponding dominions. Wilson objected. Then the Prime Minister of England invited representatives of the dominions themselves to the meetings of the Council of Ten to demonstrate their claims. But even this maneuver made no impression on Wilson.

Convinced of the intransigence of the President, the British and French demanded, if the principle of mandates be adopted, that they be immediately distributed among the countries. Wilson did not yield on this issue either. He insisted that first it was necessary to develop and approve the charter of the League of Nations.

Negotiations began between individual members of the Council of Ten. Council meetings were held in a tense atmosphere. Between Wilson and other members of the Council there were continuous bickering. Someone announced in the press what was secretly said at the meeting of the Council of Ten; someone told about Wilson's fights with other delegates. Ironic articles appeared about Wilson's idealism: it was argued that the president himself did not know how to turn his ideas into reality. The irritated president demanded an end to the newspaper hype; if it continues, he will be forced to make an exhaustive public presentation of his views. "It seemed," House wrote in his diary on January 30, 1919, "that everything went down the drain ... The President was angry, Lloyd George was angry, and Clemenceau was angry. For the first time, the president lost his temper when negotiating with them ..." 1

1 (Archive of Colonel House, vol. IV, Gospolitizdat, 1944, p. 233.)

There were rumors that Wilson was leaving the conference.

The conference has just begun - and has already cracked. The threat of Wilson's departure alarmed everyone. The meeting seemed to have reached an impasse, but then Lloyd George was found: he argued that the League of Nations was recognized as an integral part of the peace treaty; the development of separate provisions of the charter will not change this fact; this means that it is possible, without waiting for the final development of the charter, to immediately begin the distribution of mandates. But Wilson objected: once the colonies were divided, the League of Nations would remain a formal institution; the charter of the League of Nations must first be approved.

No one can know when this complicated procedure for drawing up a charter for the League of Nations will end, Lloyd George objected.

To this, Wilson replied that it would take only ten days to complete the commission's work.

But can you do it in ten days? asked Lloyd George.

Yes, Wilson confirmed.

Well, if so, you can wait, - and Lloyd George turned to Clemenceau with a question if he would find it necessary to say something.

Clemenceau stepped into the arena, silently watching the fight until now.

Third extension of the truce

Clemenceau decided to achieve his goal in a different way. On February 17, the armistice with Germany ended. The negotiation was in the hands of Marshal Foch. Much of what one would like to see in a peace treaty could be introduced into the terms of the armistice - by the way, this is how France has acted up to now. But when the French Prime Minister in the Council of Ten announced the extension of the truce and hinted that its terms would be revised again, Wilson spoke out against it. Clemenceau insisted with ardor. The single combat between the French prime minister and Wilson began. In the end, Wilson succeeded in gaining the upper hand on this issue as well. It was decided to extend the truce, leaving basically the same conditions. The only thing that Wilson yielded to was the question of the disarmament of Germany: the president did not object to the acceleration of disarmament.

Marshal Foch left for Trier. On February 14, negotiations began there for the third time to extend the truce. Foch demanded that the Germans meet the old conditions, pointing out what had not been met, and along the way putting forward additional requirements. The marshal insisted that Germany stop the offensive against the Poles in Posen, East Prussia and Upper Silesia and that Poznan, a significant part of Central Silesia and all of Upper Silesia be cleared of German troops.

At first glance, this demand did not violate Wilson's instructions: it seemed to be only a refinement of the previous negotiations on Danzig. In fact, it was a new, independent requirement. The cleansing of Posen and Silesia predetermined the fate of these areas: it was clear that France was going to give them to the Poles.

The chairman of the German delegation, Erzberger, protested. He said that Germany had almost finished demobilization, that only 200 thousand people remained under arms. Erzberger rebelled against the further disarmament of Germany. He demanded the return of German prisoners of war. He insisted on sending food to Germany, reminding Foch that in 1871 Bismarck, at the request of the French government, delivered bread to the starving population of Paris. "Despair is the mother of Bolshevism," Erzberger threatened, "Bolshevism is a bodily and mental illness caused by hunger. The best medicine is bread and law..." 1

1 (Erzberger, Germany and the Entente, p. 331.)

In Berlin, Foch's new demands caused alarm. At first, they wanted to categorically refuse to purify Poznań and Upper Silesia. Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau even submitted his resignation. But in Berlin there were unofficial representatives of the United States. They met with trusted representatives of the German government. The Germans, apparently, were informed that the question of Upper Silesia had not yet been resolved at a peace conference and was unlikely to be resolved in the Polish spirit. The German government decided to sign Foch's demand, hoping that it would not have to be carried out. Brockdorf remained at his post.

The truce was concluded for a short, indefinite period, with a three-day warning in case of a break. As regards the question of Poland, the victory formally remained with France; the Germans were to abandon all offensive operations against the Poles in Posen and in all other areas. It was decided to appoint a subcommittee to establish the Polish demarcation line and to implement the agreement on the cleansing of these areas. In fact, the Germans sabotaged the implementation of the treaty; they never cleared a single part of Silesia. Wilson himself later described Germany's tactics in the Senate as follows: "accept on principle and reject in fact." By the way, the subcommittee itself was subsequently withdrawn without any protests from the Entente, which was busy with the Paris Conference.

Adoption of the statute of the League of Nation

In the "Commission of the hotel Crillon" in the meantime, feverish work was going on. Wilson was in a hurry to complete the Charter of the League of Nations by the deadline. It was not easy: every point was controversial. The commission appointed by the plenum for the development of the charter worked from 3 to 13 February; in total it had ten meetings. Before the official opening of the commission, and then in the course of its work, there were private meetings. The Americans were negotiating with the British, then with the Italians, then with both. A lengthy discussion was caused by the question of whose draft charter to base the discussion on. Wilson pushed for the American project; the British put forward their own. After long hesitation, the president proposed to take as a basis the joint Anglo-American project, agreed upon at a number of private meetings.

With great difficulty, Wilson achieved the acceptance of the principle of mandates. Lansing later explained what argument played a decisive role in this. It was argued that if the German colonies were annexed, the Germans would demand that their value be included in the repayment of indemnity; the mandate principle made it possible to take away the colonies from Germany without any compensation.

The French delegate Léon Bourgeois demanded the creation of an international army that would operate under the operational control of the League of Nations. Without this, the French argued, the League would lose all practical significance, and its charter could turn into a theoretical treatise.

The French proposal by no means intended to make the League of Nations an instrument of collective struggle against aggression. His goal was to consolidate the military predominance of France over Germany and thus establish French hegemony on the European continent. This desire was confirmed by the fact that the delegates of France objected to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations; apparently they were plotting to turn the League into an anti-German alliance. Neither Britain nor the United States wanted this. The debate dragged on. Having met with a united bloc of all partners, the French offered to create at least an international headquarters for the League of Nations. However, this project did not find a favorable response. The French retreated.

A sharp clash was caused by the proposal of the Japanese to introduce into Article 21 of the charter, which stated the equality of religions, also the thesis of the equality of races. Japanese diplomacy was hypocritical. She herself was imbued with the spirit of racism. In this case, she only needed to achieve the abolition of those restrictions against Japanese immigration that were established in the United States and in the dominions of England. The Americans would very much like to support Japan in order to have her on their side against England. However, racial equality also meant equality between black and white; of course, such a declaration would have made it more difficult for the already dubious ratification of the League of Nations charter by the American Senate.

Day after day, the Japanese knocked first on the Americans, then on the British, seeking the adoption of their amendment. Finally, they found a way out in omitting the entire article 21, which spoke about religious equality. Thus, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their offer for a while.

On February 14, the day Marshal Foch began negotiations for an extension of the armistice, Wilson solemnly presented the statute of the League of Nations to the peace conference. "The veil of mistrust and intrigues has fallen," the president concluded his speech, "people look each other in the face and say: we are brothers, and we have a common goal. We did not realize this before, but now we gave ourselves in this

report. And here is our treaty of brotherhood and friendship.

1 (Nowak, Versailles, p. 59.)

Representatives spoke one after another. different countries. Everyone congratulated mankind on the creation of an "instrument of peace". True, Leon Bourgeois, whose draft was rejected, said that the charter of the League of Nations should be subject to changes and additions. The representative of Gejas also said that there are "not quite clear" expressions in the charter. What is meant by the word "mandate", he asked. Nobody answered him. The plenary session of the peace conference approved the president's project. The next day, Wilson, accompanied by a cannon salute, left Europe.

Discussing peace conditions

With the approval of the charter of the League of Nations, the motive that hindered the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty disappeared. The Council of Ten began to work. Its composition has changed somewhat. Lloyd George has gone to London. Orlando went with a report to Rome. Clemenceau was bedridden by an anarchist shot. It may not have been accidental that the heads of government left Paris: they were replaced by foreign ministers, and this emphasized the business-like nature of the conference. The representative of England, Lord Balfour, proposed discussing the main issues of the world - about the borders! "of Germany, about indemnifying her for losses, etc. It would be necessary to finish the discussion no later than mid-March. Baron Mackinac asked if the question of the colonies was included in the concept of "Germany's borders" He was answered in the affirmative. Various points of peace conditions appeared on the table. The countries concerned defended their projects. Passions flared up.

How heated the atmosphere can be judged by the demands of the Persian delegation. Persia did not participate in the war, but was on the list of powers invited to join the League of Nations. The Persian delegation arrived in Paris and presented to the conference a memorandum signed by Foreign Minister Moshaver el-Memalek. Referring to "historical rights" allegedly dating back to the 16th-18th centuries, the Persian government demanded that Persia be granted no more than almost half of the Caucasus, including all of Azerbaijan with the city of Baku, Russian Armenia, Nakhichevan, Nagorno-Karabakh and even part of Dagestan with the city of Derbent , as well as a huge territory beyond the Caspian Sea, extending north to the Aral Sea, and east to the Amu Darya with the cities of Merv, Ashgabat, Krasnovodsk, Khiva, and others. In total, all these areas accounted for over 578 thousand square kilometers. In addition, the Persian government also claimed large Turkish territories. It is difficult to assume that such claims were the fruit of the desires of Persian politicians alone. Apparently, behind the back of Persia was a certain large derava. In any case, the demands of Persia give an idea of ​​the atmosphere that was created at the Paris Conference.

There was no issue around which the diplomatic struggle would not boil. Japan demanded Shandong, which was sharply opposed by China. Since we have declared war on Germany, then all the areas captured by her must be returned to us, the delegates of China repeated. The British were inclined to support Japan, but the Americans stood up for China.

The French demanded that Germany be dealt with as soon as possible in order to deal with the Russian question later. Marshal Foch argued that the Allies could lose the war if they did not solve the Russian problem: this could happen when Germany settled relations with Russia in its own interests or itself became a victim of Bolshevism. According to House, the marshal, in order to fight Bolshevik Russia, was "ready to cooperate with Germany after the signing of a preliminary peace treaty, believing that such cooperation could be very valuable" 1 .

1 (Archive of Colonel House, vol. IV, p. 259.)

Clemenceau demanded that the French border be moved to the Rhine, and that an independent republic be created from the Rhine provinces, deprived of armed force and the right to reunite with Germany. Wilson, who was in the United States, responded with a categorical refusal. The French agreed to make a concession: they offered to create the Republic of the Rhine only for a limited time, after which it would be possible to allow the population to determine their own fate. Wilson did not accept this proposal.

Of course, by mid-March, the discussions on peace terms had not been completed. By this time, Wilson had returned from America. He was bombarded with requests and statements. Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania handed over to him their memorandums demanding that their requests be met. Without warning either England or France, Wilson gave an interview about the inseparability of the charter of the League of Nations and the peace treaty. He will achieve this continuity, Wilson added emphatically.

However, Wilson himself returned from America by no means a triumph. A number of senators opposed US participation in the League, fearing American involvement in European affairs. Increasingly, voices were heard in the press that Wilson had violated the Monroe Doctrine. The passage of the League of Nations charter into law required the approval of the US Senate by at least a two-thirds majority; meanwhile, the opposition in the Senate was growing stronger and stronger. Upon returning to Paris, Wilson began to receive disturbing telegrams about the agitation of his opponents. They demanded the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations.

In Europe, Wilson's difficulties were known. "The president's ideas conquered Europe," wrote one prominent historian. "We must wait...whether Wilson's ideas conquer America!" 2 Therefore, Wilson's outcry had no effect on the conference. Annoyingly shrugging off the annoying question, the delegates of the major countries continued to insist on the implementation of their programs. Clemenceau demanded a strategic border along the Rhine and the creation of an independent state from the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, in the extreme case under the protectorate of the League of Nations. The French imperialists toyed with a plan to combine Lorraine ore with Ruhr coal. Marshal Foch spoke about the danger of Bolshevism threatening Poland. He demanded the creation of a "great Poland" with the transfer of Poznan and Danzig to it. At the same time, the French were not at all touched by the interests of Poland. They were not going to defend her needs. The French imperialists wanted to create a counterbalance to Germany and Soviet Russia. In the midst of the debate, Clemenceau stated bluntly: "When the question of the formation of the Polish state was raised, it was meant not only to make amends for one of the greatest crimes of history, but also to create a barrier between Germany and Russia ..."

2 (Temperley, A history" of the Peace Conference of Paris, London 1923-1924, v. I, p. 204.)

Wilson understood this - just look at the pages of the book of his historiographer Becker. But the creation of Poland on the French model meant the strengthening of France in Europe. Neither America nor England agreed to this. "There is no need to create a new Alsace-Lorraine," said Lloyd George. Clemenceau insisted on his own, threatening to leave the conference.

However, in defending his claims, Clemenceau made a mistake. Justifying his program, he insisted that the security of France required it. Denying him a Rhine frontier, Lloyd George and Wilson offered to guarantee French frontiers in return, pledging to provide immediate assistance to France if Germany attacked her. Clemenceau knew that in America they demanded the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations. In this case, American guarantees would have no real value, because the Monroe Doctrine forbade the use of American troops outside America. Clemenceau tried to correct his oversight. On March 17, he sent a note to Wilson and Lloyd George agreeing to accept guaranteed aid from both countries. As for the Rhine provinces, Clemenceau proposed to separate the left bank of the Rhine from Germany in the political and economic sense and to establish the occupation of the left-bank provinces by the inter-allied armed forces for 30 years. At the same time, Clemenceau set the condition that the left bank and the fifty-kilometer zone on the right bank of the Rhine would be completely demilitarized.

As compensation for his concession on the Rhine question, Clemenceau demanded that the Saar Basin be handed over to France. If this does not happen, he argued, Germany, owning coal, will actually control all French metallurgy.

In response to Clemenceau's new demand, Wilson said with annoyance that he had never heard of the Saar until now.

In his temper, Clemenceau called Wilson a Germanophile. He bluntly declared that no French prime minister would sign a treaty that would not condition the return of the Saar to France.

"So if France doesn't get what she wants," the president remarked icily, "she will refuse to work with us. In that case, would you like me to return home?"

"I don't want you to come home," Clemenceau replied, "I intend to do it myself."

With these words, Clemenceau hurried out of the president's office.

The crisis in relations between France and the United States was supplemented by a sharp aggravation of contradictions between the maenads of the United States and England, as well as between France and England on the issue of partitioning Turkey. On March 20, the prime ministers and foreign ministers of France, England, the United States and Italy gathered at the apartment of Lloyd George. On the wall of Lloyd George's office hung a large map of Asiatic Turkey; it depicted in various colors the territories that go to the victorious countries. The French foreign minister laid out the whole story of the partition of Turkey, insisting on French demands. Then Lloyd George spoke. He stated that England fielded up to a million soldiers against Turkey, and insisted on his project. Wilson, by his own admission, first heard of the Sykes-Picot treaty. "It sounds like a new tea company: Saike - Pico," the American president said with a hint of disdain. He suggested sending a special commission, consisting of French, British, Italian and American representatives, to find out what the desire of the Syrians themselves was. Clemenceau did not object to the survey, but suggested that Palestine, Mesopotamia and other territories mentioned in the English requirements should also be surveyed.

The outcome of the discussion was fairly aptly defined by Wilson. When asked by House how the meeting with Clemenceau and Lloyd George went, the president replied: "Brilliant - we parted on all issues" 1 .

1 (Archive of Colonel House, vol. IV, p. 305.)

By the way, only the Americans left for Syria without waiting for the British and French experts. Returning, American experts reported that the Syrians want to be independent. Clemenceau made an unimaginable noise in protest against such a proposal. So the question of Syria was not resolved at the peace conference.

Rumors of disagreements between the powers crept into the lobby. Three days later, the newspapers reported on the disputes between France and England, depicting in detail the clash of the premiers. This time Lloyd George demanded an end to the newspaper blackmail: "If this continues, I'll leave. I can't work under these conditions," 1 he threatened. At the insistence of Lloyd George, all further negotiations were conducted in the Council of Four. From that moment on, the Council of Ten actually gave way to the so-called "big four", which consisted of Lloyd George, Wilson, Clemenceau, Orlando. Japan was not included in it, because it was not represented by the head of government. However, the "big four" was often reduced to the "troika" - Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau. The conference again stalled.

1 (Novak; Versailles, p. 86.)

"Document from Fontainebleau"

On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George sent Clemenceau and Wilson a memorandum from the dacha where he usually spent the weekend, entitled "Some remarks for a peace conference before drawing up the final draft of peace conditions." This memorandum is known as the Fontainebleau Document. It outlined the English program and at the same time criticized the French demands. First of all, Lloyd George opposed the dismemberment of Germany. “You can deprive Germany of her colonies,” Lloyd George wrote, “bring her army to the size of a police force and her navy to the level of a fleet of a power of the fifth rank. Ultimately, it is indifferent: if she considers the peace treaty of 1919 unjust, she will find means take revenge on the victors... For these reasons, I strongly object to the exclusion of the German population from Germany in favor of other nations to a greater extent than is necessary "2.

2 (David, Lloyd, George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, v. I, p. 405.)

Lloyd George spoke out against the demand of the Polish commission to transfer 2,100,000 Germans under Polish rule, just as he was against the cession of territories inhabited by Hungarians to other states. The following proposals were put forward. The Rhineland remains with Germany, but is demilitarized. Germany returns Alsace-Lorraine to France. Germany cedes to France the frontier of 1814, or else, in order to compensate France for the destroyed coal mines, the present border of Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the right to exploit the coal mines of the Saar basin for ten years. Malmedy and Morenay go to Belgium, and certain parts of the territory of Schleswig go to Denmark. Germany renounces all her rights to the former German colonies and to the leased area of ​​Qiao Chao.

As for the eastern borders of Germany, Poland receives the Danzig Corridor, however, in such a way that it covers as few territories with a German population as possible.

Having put an end to France's territorial claims, the British Prime Minister spoke out against excessive demands on the question of reparations as well. “I insisted,” Lloyd George wrote, “that only the generation that participated in the war be burdened with reparation payments.” Germany pays annually for a certain number of years a certain amount, which is fixed by the victorious powers; however, the amount of reparations must be consistent with the ability of Germany to pay. The amounts received from Germany are distributed in the following proportion: 50% - to France, 30% - to Great Britain and 20% - to other powers.

Finally, in order to limit the military power of France, Lloyd George proposed that the question of disarmament be discussed. True, this concerned primarily Germany and small countries: the five winners retained their armed forces until Germany and Russia proved their peacefulness. In exchange for agreeing to start negotiations on disarmament, Lloyd George offered France joint guarantees from Britain and the United States against a possible German attack.

"Document from Fontainebleau" caused literally a fit of rage in "" the French prime minister. Clemenceau entrusted the compilation of the answer to his closest collaborator Tardieu, but was dissatisfied with his project and began to compose a note to Lloyd George himself. The French Premier sarcastically remarked that the British Premier was proposing to place moderate territorial demands on Germany, but said nothing about concessions connected with Germany's naval position. “If it is necessary,” Clemenceau replied, “to show special indulgence towards Germany, one should offer her colonial, maritime compensation, as well as the expansion of her sphere of trade influence” 1 .

1 (Nowak, Versailles, p. 101.)

In conclusion, Clemenceau noted that the maritime and colonial powers, i.e., England in the first place, would benefit from Lloyd George's plan, because the colonies were taken from Germany, the fleet was disarmed, merchant ships were issued, and the continental powers would remain unsatisfied. Clemenceau thus refused all concessions and concessions.

The British Prime Minister did not remain in debt. “Judging by the memorandum,” wrote Lloyd George in reply, “France does not seem to attach any importance to the rich German colonies in Africa that she has taken possession of. the fact that in the matter of compensation it is repeatedly given priority ... It does not attach importance to the fact that it acquires German ships instead of French ships sunk by German submarines, and also receives part of the German navy ... "1

1 (David, Lloyd George, The Truth about the Peace Treaties, v. I, p. 420-421.)

"In reality, France is only concerned with taking Danzig from the Germans and handing it over to the Poles," 2 wrote Lloyd George. Since France considers that the English proposals are acceptable only to naval powers, Lloyd George takes them back.

2 (Ibidem.)

“I was under the illusion,” continued the British Premier, “that France attaches importance to colonies, ships, compensation, disarmament, Syria and the British guarantee to help France with all its might if it is attacked. I regret my mistake and will see to it so that it doesn't happen again." In conclusion, Lloyd George announced that he was withdrawing his offer to provide France with the coal mines of the Saar.

3 (Ibidem.)

The prime ministers' correspondence was handed over to Wilson. The meetings of the Council of Four began again. Wilson supported Lloyd George on the Saar issue. Having met with a united front of both powers, Clemenceau decided to change his demand: he offered to transfer the Saar region to the League of Nations, which in turn would give France a mandate for it for 15 years. After this period, a plebiscite will be held in the region, which will decide the future fate of the Saar. But this proposal of Clemenceau was also rejected. Wilson agreed only to send experts to the Saar to find out how France could be allowed to exploit the mines without political dominance in the Saar.

Wilson also spoke out against the secession of the Rhineland from Germany, even against its prolonged occupation by the French. But he promised, together with England, to guarantee the borders of France and to help her in the event of a German attack.

Contribution problem

The question of reparations was discussed with the same vehemence. How much can be taken from Germany - experts puzzled over this. The British Commission, chaired by the Australian Prime Minister Hughes, set a figure of 24 billion pounds sterling, almost 480 billion gold marks. Lloyd George called this figure "a wild and fantastic chimera", although he himself promised at election meetings in England to "turn the pockets of the Germans." The French demanded 3 billion pounds (60 billion gold marks) for the restoration of the northeastern departments, while according to statistics, the national wealth of all France in 1917 was only 2.4 billion pounds.

The Americans feared that Clemenceau and Lloyd George would kill the golden goose. After all, the United States could receive debts from England and France only if Germany was solvent. The American expert Davis considered it possible to demand only 25 billion dollars from the Germans.

The same disputes aroused the question of the distribution of reparations among the winners. Lloyd George proposed to give 50% of the total amount to France, England - 30% and other countries - 20%. France insisted on 58% for themselves and 25% for England. After much debate, Clemenceau announced that the last word for the French was 56% for France and 25% for England. Wilson offered 56% and 28%.

In the end, American experts proposed not to fix the figures for the indemnity, but to entrust this to a special reparation commission, which would have to present the final demands to the German government no later than May 1, 1921. The French seized on this proposal, assuming in the future through the commission to achieve the fulfillment of their plan. On other issues, no agreement was reached. Clemenceau again began to threaten to leave, which could cause a government crisis and the resignation of the prime minister. Wilson, for his part, summoned the steamer "George Washington" from America. The peace conference hung in the balance. It could be saved only by making mutual concessions.

On April 14, Clemenceau informed the president, who had not yet recovered from his illness, through House, that he agreed to the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations. For this, the Americans must, in turn, make concessions: transfer the mandate to the Saarland to France, allow Anglo-French troops to occupy the left bank of the Rhine for 15 years as a guarantee of Germany's fulfillment of the terms of the peace treaty, demilitarize the Rhine provinces, as well as a zone 50 kilometers wide on the right bank of the Rhine.

Wilson, who was experiencing great anxiety in connection with the agitation of his political opponents in America, was delighted with Clemenceau's proposal. He stated that he was ready to reconsider his categorical "no" on the Saar and Rhine issues. Colonel House informed Clemenceau of Wilson's reply. Clemenceau was delighted: he embraced the colonel. House immediately asked Clemenceau to stop attacking Wilson in French newspapers. Now the "tiger" was given the necessary order. On the morning of April 16, the Paris newspapers were full of praises for Wilson.

The agreement seemed to have been reached. How unexpected it was can be judged by the fact that in the commission where the Charter of the League of Nations was discussed, French experts still spoke out against the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter; they did not yet know about the Clemenceau-Wilson deal.

It remained to persuade the British to join Wilson's concessions. The American delegation conducted parallel negotiations with the British. They wanted the United States to give up competition in naval arms. Eventually, they were given appropriate verbal assurances. Then the British decided to support Wilson. On April 22, Lloyd George announced that he joined the President's position on the Rhine and Saar questions.

Establishment of the League of Nations

A delighted Wilson was finally given the opportunity to present the final charter of the League of Nations at the plenary session of the conference on 28 April. Leon Bourgeois proposed the creation of a military body under the League of Nations; Hymans, the Belgian delegate, began to express regret that Brussels had not been chosen as the seat of the League of Nations. Suddenly, Clemenceau broke off the debate: he declared that the proposal of the President of the United States, due to the absence of objections, was adopted unanimously. Clemenceau spoke French; he spoke quickly; the translators were silent. Most of those present did not understand him, and many did not hear him. Only after Clemenceau had moved on to the next item on the agenda did the conference learn with bewilderment that it had "adopted unanimously" the charter of the League of Nations.

The controversial issue of the Monroe Doctrine, which had so worried Wilson, was formulated as follows:

"Article 21. International obligations, such as treaties on arbitration, and agreements limited to known areas, such as the Monroe Doctrine, which ensure the preservation of peace, shall not be considered inconsistent with any of the provisions of this statute" 1 .

1 ("International politics of modern times", part 2, p. 263.)

According to the statute of the League of Nations, its founders were the states that participated in the war against Germany, as well as the newly formed states (Gedzhas, Poland, Czechoslovakia).

The second group of states consisted of countries invited to immediately join the League of Nations: Argentina, Venezuela, Denmark, Spain, Colombia, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, El Salvador, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden. In November - December 1920 they all joined the League of Nations.

Switzerland, upon accession, made a reservation about maintaining its permanent neutrality, in view of which the Council of the League of Nations recognized its "exceptional position" and indicated that Switzerland participates in the military actions of the League only with economic assistance.

The third category included all other states of the world. For their admission to the membership of the League of Nations, the consent of two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly of the League of Nations and the unanimous decision of the Council was necessary.

The main organs of the League of Nations were the Assembly of all representatives of the members of the League and the Council, which included a permanent Secretariat. Each member of the League had one vote in the general meeting of the League: thus, the British Empire had 6 votes with the dominions, and since 1923 - together with Ireland - 7 votes. The Council of the League of Nations, according to the original statute, consisted of 9 members: 5 permanent (Great Britain, Italy, USA, France, Japan) and 4 temporary, changing annually. The first provisional members of the Council of the League of Nations were Greece, Spain, Belgium, and Brazil. Since the United States did not join the League of Nations, because the Senate did not approve the Treaty of Versailles, the Council actually had 8 members.

The League of Nations recognized that any war "interests the League as a whole" and the latter must take all measures to preserve peace. At the request of any member of the League, a Council is immediately convened. In the event of a conflict between the members of the League of Nations, they submit it to arbitration or to the Council and do not resort to war until a period of three months has elapsed after the decision of the court or the report of the Council.

If a member of the League resorts to war contrary to the obligations assumed, then the other members undertake to immediately break off all commercial and financial relations with him, and the Council must invite the various governments concerned to send one or another contingent of troops "destined to maintain respect for the obligations of the League." However, the obligations of the League of Nations to curb the aggressors were outlined so vaguely that, in essence, they were reduced to zero.

The article on disarmament was formulated with the same vagueness. The League of Nations declared it necessary "to limit national armaments to the minimum compatible with national security and with the fulfillment of international obligations imposed by common action." The Council was asked, taking into account the "geographical position and special conditions of each state", to prepare plans for the limitation of armaments and submit them for consideration by the governments concerned. But only. The governments concerned could not heed such a recommendation.

With regard to mandates, they were divided into three categories. The first included those Turkish regions which "have reached such a degree of development that their existence as independent nations can be temporarily recognized." The powers that have received a mandate over this category of areas will govern them until the moment when the countries under mandate are able to govern themselves. Of course, the date and conditions for the onset of such a moment have not been determined.

The second category included areas of Central Africa, which are governed by mandate holders on the terms of the prohibition of the trade in slaves, weapons, alcohol, the preservation of freedom of conscience and religion of the subject population.

The third category included the colonies in South West Africa and certain islands in the South Pacific which are governed by the laws of the Mandatory State as an integral part of its territory.

The very distribution of mandates was not provided for by the charter of the League of Nations; that was what the peace conference was supposed to do.

Finally, the International Labor Office was organized under the League of Nations. Countries not invited to the League of Nations could be included in the labor bureau, which thus turned into a kind of test committee for those wishing to be admitted to the League.

Claims by Italy and Japan

So the agreement was reached. The Charter of the League of Nations was adopted. It remains to complete the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty. All 58 commissions of the Paris Conference were hastily completing their work. Again and again disputes flared up on this or that issue. So, the British and Americans demanded the destruction of submarines. "They should be outlawed," Wilson said. But the French insisted on the division of German submarines between the allies. In conclusion, Germany was deprived of its submarines: they went into service with the victors.

The question of the prohibition of the use of poison gases caused similar disagreements. Germany undertook to inform the Allies of the method of making gases. But the requirement to organize supervision over the chemical industry in Germany was withdrawn on the pretext that the production of gases is closely connected with the entire chemical industry, therefore the disclosure of military secrets is unthinkable without the disclosure of commercial and technical secrets. Thus, having stopped before the inviolability of the private property of the German owners of the chemical industry, in which some Americans were also interested, the peace conference left in the hands of the Germans the strongest and most dangerous weapon of war.

With a sin in half settled the main issues. It was already possible to invite the Germans to acquaint them with the preliminary terms of the treaty. But here the poorly built building of the peace conference began to tremble again: the Italian Prime Minister Orlando sharply opposed the invitation of Germany. He kept waiting for the claims of Italy to be dealt with. He supported the great powers on the principle of "do ut des" - "I give so that you give." But they forgot about Italy. Now Orlando spoke. He insisted not only on the fulfillment of the promises made by the secret London Treaty in April 1915. He went further and demanded the city of Fiume, which was never intended for Italy. The rest of the great powers did not want to hear about the implementation of the London Treaty. Fiume was also planned to be transferred to Yugoslavia.

Italian diplomats, as usual, played a double game. Orlando urged Lloyd George and Clemenceau that the Treaty of London should remain in effect. Thus, Orlando seemed to agree with that clause of the London Treaty, according to which Fiume was not intended for Italy. At the same time, Orlando told Wilson that the London Agreement was not binding on the United States and that Fiume should be handed over to Italy. Soon the double game of the Italians was revealed. Wilson persisted. Orlando said that without Fiume he could not return home: the Italians would raise indignation. To this, the president threw him: "I know the Italians better than you!". On April 23, Wilson addressed an appeal to the Italian people, demanding generosity from them. In the Council of Four, Wilson proposed to turn Fiume into an independent state under the control of the League of Nations. Orlando left the peace conference the next day. But having left Paris, he still left his expert there. A storm of indignation against Wilson was staged in Rome. The newspapers have forgotten what they wrote some time ago about Wilson the Just. Now they called him the cause of all the misfortunes of Italy.

On the day of Orlando's departure, April 24, the Japanese suddenly came out. They demanded that the Shandong issue be settled "with a minimum of delay"; if this demand is not met, they will not sign the treaty. The Japanese very well chose the moment for their speech. Italy's departure from the conference has already dealt her some blow. It was obvious that if Japan also followed Orlando, the conference might collapse. As is well known, Wilson already once failed the Japanese demand for recognition of the equality of races; to oppose the Japanese again seemed to the president too obvious a diplomatic inconvenience.

Wilson hesitated. But England took the side of Japan. Lloyd George advised the President to relent. The Japanese, in turn, announced their intention to return Shandong to China in the future. In the end, Wilson gave in: despite his repeated promises to help China, he agreed to hand over Shandong to Japan.

Yielding to Japan, the Allied diplomats took revenge on Italy. Taking advantage of the departure of Orlando, the Council of Three allowed the Greeks to occupy Smyrna, which, according to a secret treaty, was intended for Italy. On the other hand, Italy, on the verge of financial collapse, continued to negotiate with America for a loan. Fearing that the conference would sign peace with the Germans without Italy, Orlando - already without any noise - returned to Paris.

German delegation and peace conference

The German delegates were invited to the German Versailles on 25 April. The telegram emphasized that German delegates were being summoned to receive the text of the preliminary peace. The German Foreign Minister, Count Herockdorf-Rantzau, replied that he was sending delegates who would be empowered to adopt the draft treaty and hand it over to the German government. In order to set off the offensive tone of the answer, Brockdorf named several delegates, including two clerical employees. Clemenceau realized that he had gone too far: in a new telegram, he asked to send a delegation empowered to discuss all issues related to the world. On April 28, a special train with a German delegation headed by Brockdorf-Rantzau left Berlin.

In Germany, they knew about the differences in the Entente camp. Quartermaster General Trainer tried to establish contact with England and America, acting through figureheads. Ludendorff, through his agents, suggested that Clemenceau create a special German army to fight Soviet Russia. Erzberger also maintained relations with the French, with whom he developed a plan for the restoration of Belgium and Northern France through the hands of German workers. Orders were to be divided between French and German industrialists, and all work was to be carried out under the supervision and on the instructions of the French Control Commission.

The German Foreign Minister, in turn, tried to establish contacts with representatives of England and especially America. In a word, Germany tried to exploit as widely as possible the contradictions in the camp of her opponents.

In anticipation of an invitation, Germany set up several commissions to prepare its counter-draft. There they studied the debate at the peace conference, got acquainted with the mood of the governments. German agents elicited from the representatives of small countries the details of the negotiations in the Council of Four. Therefore, they knew that it was about Alsace-Lorraine, about Schleswig, Danzig.

There were frequent meetings of the German government. General Coach insisted on preserving the army at all costs. Just before Brockdorf's departure, Groener, accompanied by three generals and staff officers, came to him on behalf of Hindenburg. Groener warned against surrender. He protested against the recognition of Germany as the culprit of the war, because such recognition would entail the extradition of the generals, and the army had to be preserved under all and any conditions.

Germany's opponents, for their part, negotiated with Germany separately from each other. On the way, the German delegation was visited by a representative of Wilson. He advised Breckdorf to sign a peace treaty. Brockdorf replied that he would not sign anything beyond Wilson's 14 points.

The delegation arrived in Paris on 30 April. Quickly settled in the hotel, hoisted the antenna. They created an apparatus, preparing to start negotiations, but the conference showed no signs of life. Brockdorff-Rantzau discussed the line of his future behavior day and night. Various plans were made depending on how the situation developed.

Only on May 7, 1919, the German delegation was summoned to Versailles. Clemenceau opened the conference session with a short speech. "The hour of reckoning has come," he declared. "You asked us for peace. We agree to give it to you. We give you the book of peace." At the same time, Clemenceau emphasized that the victors had taken a solemn decision "to use all the means at their disposal in order to fully achieve the legitimate satisfaction they were following" 2 . The German delegates had previously been told that no oral discussions could be tolerated and that German comments had to be submitted in writing. The Germans were given a period of 15 days during which they could apply for clarifications. After that, the Supreme Council will decide in what time the final answer of the German government should follow.

1 (Nowak, Versailles, p. 153.)

2 (There.)

While Clemenceau's speech was being translated, the secretary of the peace conference, the Frenchman Dutasta, with a thick white book in his hands, approached the table where the German delegation was sitting, and handed over the terms of peace to Brockdorf-Rantzau.

The German minister had two responses prepared for Clemenceau's speech: one in case Clemenceau's speech was correct, and the second in case it was aggressive. Brockdorff-Rantzau chose the second option. "We are required to admit that we are the only culprits of the war," Brockdorf said. "Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie" 1 .

1 (Nowak, Versailles, p. 156.)

Germany recognizes the injustice committed by her in relation to Belgium. But only. Not only Germany made a mistake, said Brockdorf. He emphasized that Germany, like all other powers, accepts the 14 Wilson points. Thus, they are binding on both warring camps. He is therefore against excessive reparations. “The ruin and ruin of Germany,” Brockdorf threatened, “would deprive the states entitled to compensation of the benefits they claim, and would entail an unimaginable hass in the entire economic life of Europe. Both the winners and the vanquished must be on the alert to avert this formidable danger with its immeasurable consequences" 2 . Brockdorff's speech ended the whole procedure.

2 (Ibid., p. 158.)

For more than two days the Germans studied the terms of peace. Under the first impression, one of the delegates suggested leaving Paris immediately. A protest demonstration was organized in Berlin. On May 12, 1919, President Ebert and Minister Scheidemann made speeches from a balcony to a crowd gathered outside. Scheidemann shouted: "Let their hands wither before they sign such a peace treaty." But Brockdorf was ordered to stay in Paris. He tried to enter into personal negotiations with the leaders of the conference, hoping to achieve a revision of certain clauses of the treaty. The German delegation sent note after note, insisting on softening certain conditions. But Clemenceau invariably refused. The Germans also used their favorite trick here, trying to intimidate opponents with a revolution. Brockdorff-Rantzau suggested that an international labor congress should be convened at Versailles to discuss questions of labor legislation. Of course, it was not a matter of protecting workers' interests. The Germans wanted to use the labor movement to influence the peace conference. But Clemenceau understood this plan. He refused to conduct any negotiations for a congress.

Telegram after telegram was sent from Berlin protesting against Germany being held responsible for the war. The German delegation stated in the note that it did not recognize only its own country as the culprit of this disaster. After all, it is not for nothing that the peace conference has a "commission to investigate the responsibility of the instigators of the war."

Such a commission has indeed been created. The Germans, having learned about its existence, demanded that they be informed of the results of its work.

Clemenceau caustically replied to the Germans that Germany's incessant desire to shift blame could only be understood if she really felt it behind her. After all, Germany itself in November 1918 declared that it agreed to compensate for all losses that occurred as a result of its attack on land, on water and from the air.

In response to the argument that the new Germany could not be held responsible for the actions of the old government, Clemenceau recalled the year 1871, when Germany did not ask the French Republic if it was willing to be held responsible for the sins of the French monarchy. In the same way, in Brest, Germany forced the new Russia to recognize the obligations of the tsarist government.

On May 20, Count Brockdorf asked for an extension of the deadline for submitting a response. He did not lose hope of playing on the contradictions among the allies and therefore insisted on a delay. He was given 8 days. The German ambassador left for Spa. Representatives of the German government also arrived there. On May 29, Brockdorff-Rantzau presented Clemenceau with a reply note to Germany. "Having read in the said document about the conditions of peace," wrote Brockdorf, "the demands that the victorious force of the enemy presented us, we were horrified" 1 . Germany protested against all points of the peace conditions and put forward its own counterproposals. The Germans agreed to a 100,000-strong army, but insisted on admitting Germany to the League of Nations. They refused in favor of France from Alsace-Lorraine, demanding, however, that a plebiscite be held there. They expressed their readiness to cede to the Poles a significant part of the Posen province and give Poland access to open sea. They accepted the transfer of their colonies to the League of Nations, on the condition that Germany also be recognized as entitled to a mandate. As reparations, Germany agreed to pay 100 billion gold marks, of which 20 billion before May 1, 1926. She conceded part of her fleet. With regard to guilt in the war, Germany insisted on the creation of an impartial commission that would investigate this issue.

1 ("International politics of modern times", part 2, p. 251.)

While the Council of Four was getting acquainted with the German counterproposals, Brockdorf was visited by unofficial representatives of the warring powers. He had both the French and the British. The Germans had the idea that the enemy was ready to make concessions. From some sources, the Germans learned about the differences on the question of disarmament. However, when on May 23 the Council of Four discussed the report of the military experts of the Supreme Council on the limitation of armaments of small states, more than thirty people were present. With such a number, it was tricky to keep the secret!

Shortly before this meeting, military experts were instructed to determine the number of troops of small nations in proportion to the army left to Germany and amounting to 100,000 people. This meant that Austria should have an army of 15,000, Hungary 18,000, Bulgaria 10,000, Czechoslovakia 22,000, Yugoslavia 20,000, Romania 28,000, Poland 44,000 and Greece 12,000.

Germany's allies were not represented at the conference, although Austria had already received an invitation. They could not openly express their protest, but the rest of the countries did not want to hear about such a composition of their armies. The American General Bliss, who made the report, believed that 100,000 people were not enough for Germany, that the army should be increased and, accordingly, the number of troops of small nations should be increased. But Clemenceau sharply opposed the revision of this question. On June 5, representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece were invited to a meeting of the Council in Wilson's apartment. At a preliminary meeting, after a lengthy discussion, they worked out a common line of conduct - to refuse to reduce armies. The President's meeting took place in an extremely tense atmosphere. The delegates of the invited countries categorically insisted on the preservation of their armies. In vain they were persuaded by Wilson and Lloyd George. Clemenceau did not speak. The delegates felt his tacit support. The agreement was never reached. The delegates of the smaller countries left the meeting.

Germany was aware of these differences and hoped that they would help her win concessions. But her expectations were not met. On June 16, Brockdorf was handed a new copy of the peace treaty. It was the same thick book, in which some changes were now written in red ink by hand. France renounced its sovereignty in the Saarland in favor of the League of Nations. Five commissioners were appointed to manage the region. A plebiscite was to be held in Upper Silesia. In an accompanying note, Clemenceau stressed that the treaty "should be accepted or rejected as it stands today." Five days were given for a response. If no answer is received, the Powers will announce that the armistice is at an end and will take such measures as they deem necessary "in order to enforce and fulfill these conditions by force." The only concession was that the Germans, at their insistent request, added another 48 hours to these five days.

The German delegation left for Berlin.

The meetings of the German government began. Some ministers, including Brockdorff-Rantzau, proposed not to sign a peace treaty, hoping that disagreements in the camp of the victors would make it possible to achieve milder conditions. Others insisted on signing a peace treaty, fearing the collapse of the empire. But even those who demanded signing openly said that the conditions should not be met. Hindenburg's opinion was requested. He replied that the army was unable to resist and would be defeated; the army and its supreme headquarters must be preserved at all costs. They secretly negotiated with the French. They made it clear that the Kaiser and the generals would not be touched.

On June 21, the German government announced that it was ready to sign a peace treaty without recognizing, however, that the German people were responsible for the war. The next day, Clemenceau replied that the allied countries would not agree to any changes in the treaty and to any reservations and demanded either signing the peace or refusing to sign. On June 23, the German National Assembly decided to sign peace without any reservations. The mood was extremely tense. They were afraid that the Entente might launch an offensive. Some deputy, according to Erzberger, worried about the protracted debate, hysterically shouted: "Where is my car? I must go immediately! French pilots will appear tonight!" 1 .

1 (Erzberger, Germany and the Entente, p. 356.)

June 28, 1919 new minister German Foreign Affairs Minister Hermann Müller and Minister of Justice Bell signed the Treaty of Versailles.

Terms of the Treaty of Versailles

Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany undertook to return Alsace-Lorraine to France within the borders of 1870 with all bridges across the Rhine. The coal mines of the Saar basin became the property of France, and the management of the region was transferred to the League of Nations for 15 years, after which the plebiscite was to finally decide on the ownership of the Saar. The left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the Entente for 15 years. The territory 50 kilometers east of the Rhine was completely demilitarized. In the districts of Eupen and Malmedy, a plebiscite was envisaged; as a result of it, they retreated to Belgium. The same applied to the districts of Schleswig-Holstein: they went over to Denmark. Germany recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Poland and refused in favor of the first from the Gulchinsky region in the south of Upper Silesia, and in favor of Poland - from some regions of Pomerania, from Poznan, most of West Prussia and part of East Prussia. The question of Upper Silesia was decided by a plebiscite. Danzig with the region passed to the League of Nations, which undertook to make it a free city. It was included in the Polish customs system. Poland received the right to control the railway and river routes of the Danzig corridor. German territory was divided by the Polish Corridor. In general, one eighth of the territory and one twelfth of the population departed from Germany. The Allies occupied all the German colonies. England and France divided Cameroon and Togo among themselves. The German colonies in South West Africa went to the Union of South Africa; Australia got New Guinea and New Zealand got Samoa. A significant part of the German colonies in East Africa was transferred to Great Britain, part - to Belgium, the Kyong triangle - to Portugal. The islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator that belonged to Germany, the Kiao-Chao region and the German concessions in Shandong became the possessions of Japan.

Compulsory conscription in Germany was abolished. The army, which consisted of volunteers, was not to exceed 100,000 men, including a contingent of officers not exceeding 4,000 men. The General Staff was dissolved. The term for hiring non-commissioned officers and soldiers was determined at 12 years, and for newly appointed officers - 25 years. All German fortifications were destroyed, with the exception of the southern and eastern ones. The navy was reduced to 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 destroyers. It was forbidden to have a German submarine fleet. The rest of the German warships were to be transferred to the Allies or destroyed. Germany was forbidden to have military and naval aviation and any kind of airships. However, Germany was liberated from occupation. To monitor the implementation of the military terms of the treaty, three international control commissions were created.

The economic terms of the agreement were as follows. By May 1, 1921, a special reparation commission was to determine the amount of indemnity that Germany was obliged to cover within 30 years. Until May 1, 1921, Germany pledged to pay the Allies 20 billion marks in gold, goods, ships and securities. In exchange for the sunken ships, Germany was to provide all of its merchant ships with a displacement of over 1,600 tons, half of the ships over 1,000 tons, one quarter of its fishing vessels and one fifth of its entire river fleet, and within five years build merchant ships for the allies of 200 thousand tons per year. Within 10 years, Germany pledged to supply France with up to 140 million tons of coal, Belgium - 80 million, Italy - 77 million. Germany was supposed to transfer to the Allied Powers half of the entire stock of dyes and chemical products and one-fourth of the future production until 1925. Germany renounced its rights and advantages in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt and agreed to the protectorate of France over Morocco and Great Britain over Egypt. Germany had to recognize the treaties to be concluded with Turkey and Bulgaria. She pledged to renounce Brest-Litovsk, as well as from Bucharest, peace and recognize and respect the independence of all territories that were part of the former Russian Empire by August 1, 1914. Article 116 of the peace treaty recognized Russia's right to receive from Germany the corresponding part of reparations. Germany left its troops in the Baltic republics and in Lithuania until further notice from the allies. In this way, Germany became an accomplice to the intervention in Soviet Russia.

ON THE EVE OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

German blackmail before the conclusion of peace. A truce between the Entente and the German bloc was concluded for 36 days. Five times during this time Germany asked for at least a preliminary peace. The Entente did not agree. "Waiting for Wilson," was her informal reply. The point, however, was not in Wilson - he himself was in no hurry and arrived in Paris only on December 13, 1918. The bottom line was that the winners had not yet managed to agree on peace terms. In all large and small capitals of 27 countries participating in the struggle against Germany, including those created after her defeat, preparatory work was going on. They got handbooks on individual issues, compiled memos, instructed historians and economists to rummage through old treaties and other diplomatic documents in search of justification for this or that claim. Romania tried to establish a common line of conduct with Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia and Greece. Paris and London conferred continuously. Diplomatic couriers scurried between the two capitals. The prime ministers and foreign ministers of France and Italy have gathered in London. Many points of the forthcoming peace treaty caused serious disagreements. Secret agreements surfaced that changed the prevailing situation, and this, in turn, required amendments to the proposed treaty.

More than others, England and France were worried about the inheritance of Turkey, divided by the Saike-Pico agreement in May 1916. As you know, Italy, having learned about the secret agreement, was alarmed and insistently demanded for a year to allow it to this division. In April 1917, Lloyd George, in need of Italian help in the Middle East, offered to cede Smyrna and part of other Turkish territories to them. At Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne, the British and French agreed to hand over Smyrna to the Italians. However, this seemed insufficient. They claimed additional territories inhabited by Greeks and Turks. The negotiations dragged on again until August 1917. Finally, it was agreed that the treaty would come into force only with the consent of Russia. But the Provisional Government was overthrown in October 1917. The question arose as to whether the promise made to the Italians was binding. Negotiations dragged on for another year and resumed after the defeat of Germany. In December 1918, Clemenceau came to London to seek the annulment of the agreement concluded in Saint-Jean-de-Morienne and insist on giving Cilicia and Syria, occupied by British troops, to France. Lloyd George went to meet Clemenceau, but in turn demanded Mosul for England as compensation, as well as Palestine. Secret negotiations took place on 2 and 3 December. France hesitated. Italy demanded the promised Smyrna. The situation got more and more complicated.

The alliance between the victorious countries was concluded according to the principle: "beat together, go apart." After the war, the paths of the allies diverged further and further. This was primarily used by Germany.

For a long time Historians of diplomacy, mesmerized by the triumph of the Entente, misjudged the behavior of post-war Germany. The Germans themselves took care of this, portraying Germany as an unfortunate victim of the Versailles "dictatorship". Those supporters of the Entente who did not agree with the terms of the peace also tried. One way or another, but imperialist Germany was portrayed as almost a meek lamb, resignedly putting its neck under the knife. In fact, it was a wounded predator, licking its wounds with a growl and vigilantly watching its enemies, waiting to see if it was possible to rush into battle again. In December 1918, the German High Command succeeded in withdrawing the entire army across the Rhine. Not a single part of it was captured. The ruling circles in Germany breathed a sigh of relief: the plan to preserve the army seemed to be fulfilled. True, the army was no longer the same: it quickly succumbed to the influence of the revolution. But for the time being, it was still possible to frighten the victors with the fact that the army was preserved and, in case of need, would be able to continue resistance. Part of the troops stood near Berlin, where the waves of revolution were rising. The government demanded the disarmament of the army before it entered Berlin, but the high command insisted on the disarmament of the workers. With the knowledge, and more often on the direct orders of the high command, Germany was covered with a network of various volunteer formations, from which the cadres of the fascist party subsequently emerged. There were detachments of volunteers Rosbach, Lyuttsov, Elp. Erhardt's brigade, the "Baltic Defense", etc. All these formations were preparing to suppress the revolution in Germany. Secretly and certainly preparing to crush the popular movement, the German imperialists at the same time speculated on the revolution, threatening the Entente countries that the movement might spread to them as well. Taking advantage of this blackmail and aware of the differences among the Entente, the German imperialists began to sabotage the fulfillment of the terms of the Compiègne armistice. They delayed the departure of French prisoners, did not return the stolen valuables, and in every possible way hampered the surrender of submarines and armored cruisers. Moreover, Germany continued to lay down new submarines, although under the terms of the armistice she had to surrender her entire submarine fleet. In total, 64 boats were built at German shipyards. Germany frustrated the plan for the supply of locomotives and wagons, and among the steam locomotives she handed over there were many faulty ones.

“I think,” Hoffmann admitted, “that so far the Entente has no idea what is going on with us, otherwise it would have long ago demanded that we stop cheating. The Entente still believes that we have a strong army and that we are playing a comedy with them.

Truce extension. Meanwhile, the truce expired. From the Entente came a demand to send commissioners to extend the truce. The note was sent to the German High Command. The German military took advantage of this to gloatingly emphasize that the Entente does not take into account the Berlin government. At a preliminary meeting with the German delegation, Hindenburg proposed that the following conditions be achieved when extending the armistice: the bridgeheads and the neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine are destroyed; the border runs along the Rhine, and freedom of communication is maintained between Germany and the occupied regions; the occupying army must be reduced and the blockade lifted.

On December 12 and 13, in Trier, the German delegation negotiated with Foch. In response to the marshal's protests about the delay in fulfilling the terms of the armistice, Erzberger said that the deadline was too short, that the allies themselves, for their part, did not fulfill their promise to give Germany food. Foch ignored this objection. Then Erzberger pointed out the danger of revolution: the army and the country are in a state of dangerous fermentation, a coup is possible. Foch took note of this. The Trier agreement extended the armistice for another month, until January 13, 1919. As a new guarantee, the Allies reserved the right to occupy a neutral zone on the right bank of the Rhine, north of the Cologne bridgehead and to the Dutch border. Occupation must be given six days' notice.

Immediately, the allies negotiated for themselves free passage through Danzig and the Vistula. It was supposed to send the Polish army under the command of General Haller, which was formed in France, to Danzig. The Allies were preparing a bridgehead for the Poles to fight the Bolsheviks, but the Germans wanted to take it upon themselves; secretly from the allies, they themselves negotiated with the Poles. Here is what Hoffmann wrote about the plans of the German imperialists: “We had very interesting negotiations with the Poles. They offer to hold Vilna against the Bolsheviks if we allow them to lead troops from Warsaw to Vilna. I'm all for it, as our troops don't want to fight anymore. How the government decides, I don't know yet."

The monthly extension of the truce was again not enough; and by that date the Allies had not completed preliminary negotiations. In addition, France was in no hurry, because the conclusion of the peace would force Foch to demobilize the army, and the truce would allow the soldiers to be kept under arms. A new extension was needed, especially since the revolutionary movement was expanding in Germany; Erzberger in Berlin had to go to the station in a roundabout way, as there were street battles in the area of ​​the station. On January 14, 1919, in Kassel, a government delegation met with the German high command. We discussed the line of conduct. They decided to offer the allies a common front against the Bolsheviks in exchange for concessions in the West. The Germans were ready to let the Entente troops into Berlin if the proletarian revolution won there. “If they, against all odds,” Hoffmann wrote about the Spartacists, “seize power, Berlin will be occupied by the Entente. Such prospects are not very encouraging, but still it is some kind of insurance.

To give Berlin to national enemies, but not to one's own people - such was the position of the ruling circles in Germany.

During the negotiations on the extension of the truce, Foch demanded that 58,000 agricultural machines be sent as a fine for undelivered locomotives and wagons. In addition, the marshal insisted on the subordination of Russian prisoners of war in Germany to the Allied commission, the immediate return of all property taken by Germany from Northern France and Belgium, and the provision of the German merchant fleet at the disposal of the Allies to transport food to Germany and other European countries. The Germans were given 24 hours to respond.

Erzberger asked for an extension of the sentence; he objected to all points. Marshal remained implacable. Erzberger again used an already tried and tested means: the German representatives tried to frighten the allies with the threat of revolution and persistently offered their services to fight Bolshevism. In the meantime, information had been received from Germany that the army had entered Berlin and set about disarming the workers. The massacre began. As soon as Erzberger received a message about the murder of Karl Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg, he hurried to Marshal Foch. “I went at 11 o'clock to Marshal Foch at the station,” says Erzberger in his memoirs, “where I informed the opponents of the news that I had just received about the murder of Liebknecht and Rosa Luxemburg. This message made a deep impression on all those present. I immediately stated that the issuance of agricultural material before March 1, 1919 is impossible: it would destroy German agriculture and make future harvest impossible.

Foch, who initially insisted that 50% of the cars be delivered immediately, reduced two-thirds of this amount and agreed to set the deadline for delivery on May 1, and then only "in principle." So German diplomacy exchanged Liebknecht's blood for cars.

On January 16, the truce was extended again for one month, until February 17, 1919. Foch's demands were accepted: the Germans agreed to place their entire merchant fleet at the disposal of the Allies to provide Germany with food. At the same time, the German delegation agreed to the change of the German crew - "a decree adopted in defense of Bolshevism," as Erzberger admitted.

The program of the powers at the peace conference. The terms of the armistice to a certain extent predetermined the terms of the peace. These conditions were basically prepared long ago. They were only subject to constant changes in connection with the new balance of power. The French imperialists dreamed of dismembering Germany. They very much wanted to push Germany back to the position she had before the Frankfurt Peace. It is not for nothing that Clemenceau himself, in his speeches and remarks, constantly returned to the Frankfurt Peace, recalling, not without malice, that he had once refused to sign it. But the most aggressive elements in France demanded a Germany reshaped along the lines of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648.

What were the true intentions of France can be judged by the secret agreement concluded by France with tsarist Russia in February 1917, literally on the eve of the overthrow of tsarism. Russia agreed to the French plan for establishing borders with Germany, provided that France satisfies the desire of tsarist Russia to get Constantinople and the straits and recognizes Russia's complete freedom in establishing its western borders. Under this secret agreement, France received Alsace-Lorraine and the entire coal-mining basin of the Saar valley. The German border ran along the Rhine. The German territories located on the left bank of the Rhine were separated from Germany and constituted autonomous and neutral states. France occupied these states with her troops until Germany finally satisfied all the conditions and guarantees that would be included in the peace treaty. In a veiled form, it was almost an eternal occupation, because one could always find proof that Germany "not finally" satisfied all the conditions.

At one time, the publication of this secret agreement by the Bolsheviks caused a commotion throughout the world. On December 19, 1917, the British Foreign Minister Balfour declared officially in the House of Commons: “We never gave our consent to this matter ... We never wanted this, we never patronized this idea ».

The French press indignantly wrote that all this was fiction. But the frontier along the Rhine has always, in one form or another, remained the demand of the French imperialists. First of all, the French generals insisted on it. The interview of Marshal Foch, given by him to the Times correspondent on April 19, 1919, went around the whole of England. Striking a map of the French-German border with a pencil, Marshal Foch said: “There are no natural barriers along the entire border. Will we really have to hold the Germans here if they attack us again? No! Here! Here! Here!".

And the marshal drew several times with a pencil along the Rhine.

The Rhine frontier by itself did not determine France's entire program. With a population of only 40 million, and almost not increasing, France was afraid even of a disarmed Germany with its 70 million continuously increasing population. French strategists wanted to create a bloc of countries on the other side of Germany that would replace their former ally - tsarist Russia. Restored Poland and Czechoslovakia, strengthened Romania and Yugoslavia were to form a chain of France's allies on the other side of Germany and at the same time a barrier between Germany and Soviet Russia. With the help of huge indemnities, called reparations only for the sake of propriety, the French imperialists hoped to undermine the economic might of Germany. The colonies of France expanded at the expense of Germany in Africa and at the expense of Turkey in Asia Minor.

The fulfillment of this plan, i.e., dominion over the Central and known part of Eastern Europe, penetration into the Balkans, strong positions in Africa and the Middle East - made France the hegemon of Europe. This was to be consolidated at a peace conference. “... This peace treaty, like all others, is and cannot but be only a continuation of the war,” wrote Clemenceau, his closest adviser and member of the French delegation at the Paris Conference, in the preface to the book by Tardieu.

The execution of the French program fell to the lot of a ruthless man who once said that "20 million Germans are superfluous." Over the long years of political struggle, Clemenceau gained vast experience. "Crusher of ministries", "tiger" - these were the nicknames of Clemenceau, who managed to overturn several ministerial offices with deft maneuvers.

The position of French diplomacy at the conference was quite strong: behind it stood a huge continental army; Marshal Foch dictated the terms of the armistice to Germany and has already achieved a lot.

But even such an experienced and inflexible politician as Clemenceau found it difficult to carry out his program at the conference. We had to maneuver, retreat, put forward vague formulations, push our rivals head-on. The world was turning not so much into a "continuation of the war" with Germany, but into a struggle between recent allies.

England, whose interests were represented by Lloyd George, having achieved the crushing of Germany, wanted at the conference to consolidate by a peace treaty what had been obtained by force of arms. England's naval superiority determined her position at the conference. Germany as a maritime power ceased to exist. True, her fleet was not defeated in battle, but a significant part of it was in the English harbor of Scapa Flow. Most of the colonies of Germany passed to England. In her hands were Mesopotamia, Arabia and Palestine, taken by the English army from Turkey. The superiority of England was reinforced by an alliance with Japan. Based on Japan, England could resist the United States. On the other hand, in order to combat France's exorbitantly increased claims in Europe, she could rely on the very United States, which also objected to the dismemberment of Germany following the example of the Peace of Westphalia. England could neutralize the penetration of France into the Balkans by supporting Italy against France and, on the other hand, by organizing the Balkan countries against the same France.

The weak point in Lloyd George's plan was the attitude towards Germany. Objecting to the dismemberment of Germany, Lloyd George thought at that time to use it against the Soviet country. And this required the preservation of Germany as a military power, thereby creating an opportunity for Germany, having gathered her strength, to again oppose the same England.

America's position in the circle of world powers changed dramatically at the end of the war. From a debtor country, the United States has become a creditor country, to which Europe owes about $10 billion. It was impossible to ensure the collection of debts without interfering in European affairs. It was necessary to finally abandon the former position of non-intervention - and the US president for the first time in the history of the country left the borders of his homeland, leaving for the old continent, Europe.

The then leaders of America were frightened by the sea power of England. “The destruction of the German navy,” admits Becker, who wrote a book about Wilson, “gave the British an unparalleled preponderance in history over all powers ... The naval power of England increased even more thanks to the alliance between Britain and Japan, the third great power of the world.”

Considering the possibility of a conflict between Great Britain and the United States unlikely - "though not because of a feeling of mutual sympathy", but because both powers possessed an excess of territory on the globe - Becker concludes: "Nevertheless, England's naval superiority was an important point that determined her behavior at the peace conference.

Wilson himself supported the position that the American fleet should be such that it could compete with any fleet in the world. “Not a single fleet in the world,” Wilson said on February 3, 1916 in Saint-Louis, “does not have to defend such a far-reaching area as the American fleet; therefore, it must, in my opinion, surpass all other fleets of the world in its activity.

In order to weaken England and Japan, the United States sought to terminate the Anglo-Japanese alliance. On the other hand, it was possible to complicate the position of England in Europe by preventing the complete defeat of Germany. In this matter, the United States and England played the same card. But Lloyd George put it against France and Russia, and Wilson - against England and the Soviet country.

The US position also had its own strengths. Formally, the peace treaty was built on the basis of Wilson's 14 points - at least both warring coalitions officially announced this. The eyes of the whole world were riveted on Wilson. Everyone saw him as a savior. In Europe, Wilson had dizzying meetings. In Paris, he was received more enthusiastically than Foch, who was hailed as a national hero. The entire pacifist press of the world supported the faith in the saving mission of the president. "Wilson, don't give up!" - with such a slogan, a full-page Labor newspaper came out, opposing the champions of the "new diplomacy" to the diplomats of the old school.

Wilson, in general, skillfully and persistently used the strong position of the United States and achieved a number of serious successes at the conference, despite the fact that he met very experienced diplomatic rivals in the person of Clemenceau and Lloyd George. They could not forgive him for their failures; therefore, in retaliation, they characterized him as a figure who was completely unsophisticated in matters of diplomacy and, moreover, naively imagined that he was really called to save the world. “I think,” Lloyd George wrote about Wilson, “that the idealistic president really looked at himself as a missionary whose vocation was to save the poor European pagans ... The outburst of his feelings was especially striking when, speaking of the League of Nations, he became to explain the failure of Christianity to achieve lofty ideals. “Why,” he asked, “Jesus Christ did not achieve that the world believed in his teaching? Because he preached only ideals, and did not indicate a practical way to achieve them. I offer a practical scheme to carry to the end the aspirations of Christ. Clemenceau silently opened his dark eyes wide and looked around at those present.

Wilson's diplomatic successes include, first of all, the conclusion of a truce on the basis of 14 points, the introduction of the charter of the League of Nations into the peace treaty, and Italy's refusal of her claims. But the president's diplomacy also had its weaknesses. First of all, Wilson did not have a majority in Congress: at the last presidential elections in November 1918, the Democratic Party, of which he was the leader, was defeated, so he had to constantly look back at the opposition. Secondly, Wilson's vulnerable side was his desire to prevent the complete defeat of Germany, which in fact meant preserving her economic and political opportunities to prepare for a new war. Finally, an extremely weak point of Wilson's diplomacy was the attitude towards Soviet Russia. In paragraph 6 of his 14 peace conditions, Wilson insisted on such a solution to questions concerning Russia that would guarantee her "full and unhindered opportunity to accept independent decision concerning her own political development and her national policy." But when Wilson moved from this magnificent declamation to practical questions, this point turned into a program for the dismemberment of Russia. In the official American commentary on the 14 points, compiled by Colonel House (a member of the US delegation to the Paris Conference and a personal friend of Wilson), and then approved by the President, the 6th point was deciphered as follows:

“The main question is whether Russian territory should be considered equivalent to the territory that previously belonged to the Russian Empire. It is clear that this is not so, because point 13 presupposes the creation of an independent Poland, a condition which excludes the restoration of the territory of the empire. What is recognized as right for the Poles, of course, should also be recognized for the Finns, Lithuanians, Latvians, and perhaps also for the Ukrainians.

The dismemberment of Russia does not end there. American diplomacy suggested considering the Caucasus "as part of the problem of the Turkish Empire." The Turkestan republics were recommended to be transferred as a mandated territory to some great power. Wilson even took care of Great Russia and Siberia. "A peace conference," House's official commentary said, "may require the establishment of a government competent enough to speak on behalf of these territories."

Although Italy was included in the group of great powers at the peace conference, after the defeat at Caporetto, no one took her into account. True to its character as an international "jackal," Italy hovered around the table of the great powers, waiting for a piece of booty, which she planned as a reward for betraying the Triple Alliance. Supporting the demands of one or the other great power, Italy moved from obsequiousness to threats; she even left the peace conference, which, by the way, was not noticed, just as they did not pay attention to her embarrassing return to the meeting room. Only on one issue did its representatives—Prime Minister Orlando and Foreign Minister Sonnino—not change their position before they slammed the door as they left, and after they stole back through the same door: Italy insisted all the time on intervention against Soviet Russia.

Japan was represented by Saionji, Makino and other delegates, who were called "silent partners" - so rarely did they have to speak. In controversial issues concerning Europe and Africa, they did not put forward their claims, but systematically supported England and the USA, hoping for appropriate compensation in Pacific issues. In these cases, their silence was replaced by uncontrollable verbosity. Staying on the sidelines in the American-European conflict and, nevertheless, deepening it in every possible way, Japanese diplomats, to the noise of a general skirmish, sought to capture the Asian mainland.

As for the other countries participating in the peace conference, they did not play an independent role, and if they did, it was only in the role of retinue or clients of the great powers.

Contradictions between countries could not help breaking through at the peace conference. It was clear to everyone. It is no coincidence that Balfour, before the Paris Conference, dropped: "It seems that the peace conference will turn into a somewhat restless and stormy enterprise."

PARIS CONFERENCE (January 18 - June 28, 1919)

Organization of the conference. In total, more than a thousand delegates attended the conference. They were accompanied by a huge number of employees: scientific experts - historians, lawyers, statisticians, economists, geologists, geographers, etc. - translators, secretaries, stenographers, typists and even soldiers. Wilson brought guards with him from America, as did Lloyd George from London. The number of employees serving the delegation reached 1,300 among the Americans. The maintenance of the American mission cost 1.5 million dollars. There were more than 150 journalists officially registered at the conference, not counting the endless number of reporters and interviewers circling around the hotels occupied by delegations.

In addition to official delegates, representatives of a number of colonial countries, small powers, newly created states, and public organizations arrived at the peace conference in Paris. Noisy Paris, quite accustomed to a large influx of visitors, lived for several months in the interests of a peace conference.

On January 12, the first business meeting of the prime ministers, foreign ministers and plenipotentiaries of the five major powers took place at the Quai d'Orsay. The presiding French Minister of Foreign Affairs, Pichon, invited those present to discuss the procedure for the work of the conference.

The question immediately arose about the language of the conference, the protocols and future texts of the peace treaty. Clemenceau stated that until now all diplomats had used French; there is no reason to change this custom, especially if you remember "what France has experienced." Lloyd George suggested using English as well, because half the world speaks that language; it must also be taken into account that the United States is acting in Europe for the first time in the diplomatic field. The Italian Foreign Minister Sonnino, who, by the way, was fluent in French, declared that the French proposal was an insult to Italy. If one takes into account what France has experienced, then one should not forget that Italy sent 4 to 5 million soldiers to the front, said Sonnino, insisting on the admission of the Italian language. "A bad start for the future union of nations," Clemenceau grumbled angrily. In the end, English and French were recognized as standard languages.

Having settled the question of the language, we began to discuss the rules of the conference. This presented great difficulties, because all 27 nations insisted on their participation in debates, meetings and decisions. They looked for precedents in history, recalled the organization of the Congress of Vienna, discussed whether its "commission of four" or "eight" could be taken as a model, etc.

Clemenceau insisted that the opinions of the great powers should be taken into account first.

“Until now I have always held the opinion that there is an agreement between us,” said Clemenceau, “by virtue of which the five great powers themselves resolve important questions before they enter the conference room.

In the event of a new war, Germany will throw all her armies not on Cuba or Honduras, but on France; France will again respond. Therefore, I demand that we stick to the accepted proposal; it boils down to the fact that meetings of representatives of the five named great powers take place and, thus, the resolution of important issues is achieved. Discussion of secondary issues should be left to commissions and committees before the conference meeting.

On the other hand, the English dominions demanded to be treated as independent states. "We are as important as Portugal," said the Canadian delegates. Wilson objected to the discussion of issues in a close circle. England did not oppose Clemenceau's proposal, but insisted on giving the small nations the opportunity to take part in the work of the conference.

After a lengthy discussion, the French draft drawn up by Vertelo was adopted. All countries represented at the conference were divided into four categories. The first included the warring powers "having common interests" - the United States, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan. These countries will participate in all meetings and commissions. The second category are warring powers "having private interests" - Belgium, Brazil, British dominions and India, Greece, Guatemala, Haiti, Gejas, Honduras, China, Cuba, Liberia, Nicaragua, Panama, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Serbia , Siam, Czechoslovak Republic. They will participate in those meetings at which issues concerning them are discussed. The third category includes the powers that are in a state of severing diplomatic relations with the German bloc - Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia and Uruguay. Their delegations participate in meetings if issues concerning them are discussed. Finally, the fourth category consists of neutral powers and states in the process of formation. They may speak either orally or in writing when they are invited by one of the five major Powers having common interests, and only to meetings devoted specifically to the consideration of questions directly concerning them. Moreover, the regulation emphasized, “only insofar as these issues are affected.” Neither Germany nor its allies were mentioned in the regulations.

The representation between the countries was distributed as follows: the USA, the British Empire, France, Italy and Japan sent 5 plenipotentiary delegates to the peace conference; Belgium, Brazil and Serbia - 3 each; China, Greece, Gejas, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Siam and the Czechoslovak Republic - 2 each; the British dominions (Australia, Canada, South Africa) and India were represented by 2 delegates, New Zealand - by one delegate. All other countries received the right to send one delegate each. It was specifically stipulated that "the conditions for the representation of Russia will be established by the conference when the cases concerning Russia are considered."

According to the regulations, the President of the French Republic was to open the peace conference. Following this, the head of the French Council of Ministers was to preside temporarily. A secretariat was set up to edit the protocols, with one representative from each of the five main countries. Further, the maintenance of protocols was carefully provided for, the storage of documents, who and how has the right to submit petitions. But later all this careful regulation was violated. One meeting followed another. Soon everyone was confused about which meeting is official and where is a private meeting. It is hardly possible to name another such disorderly conference in the history of diplomacy as the Paris one: its most important meetings were left completely without protocols and even without secretarial notes. When Clemenceau, who was up to his neck in these endless meetings, was told about this, he muttered: "To hell with the protocols ...".

In essence, the division of countries into categories and the distribution of mandates between countries already predetermined the nature of the work of the conference. Initially, everything was concentrated in the Council of Ten, which consisted of the prime ministers and foreign ministers of the five great powers. They were: from the USA - President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing, from France - Prime Minister Clemenceau and Foreign Minister Pichon, from England - Prime Minister Lloyd George and Foreign Minister Balfour, from Italy - Prime Minister Orlando and Minister Foreign Affairs Baron Sonnino, from Japan - Baron Makino and Viscount Shinda. The remaining delegates of the conference were present only at the plenary sessions of the conference, of which there were only seven in almost half a year of its work.

The regulation has been approved. They were about to close the meeting, when suddenly Marshal Foch demanded to speak. Regardless of the fact that the conference was quite numerous, Foch openly proposed organizing a campaign against the Bolsheviks. In the hands of the marshal was Paderevsky's message about the occupation of Vilna by the Bolsheviks. Marshal insisted on the transfer of troops to the Danzig-Thorn region: this explains why Foch, when discussing the extension of the armistice with Germany, demanded the passage of troops through Danzig. The core of the troops intended for the expedition were to be the US Army. “They show an even greater cheerfulness,” Foch explained his proposal. The marshal's proposal had a threefold purpose: it provided assistance to the French ally, Poland, on the other hand, linked the United States with the interests of France, and, finally, removed American troops from France.

Wilson was not averse to implementing his plan to fight the Bolsheviks, but in this form the proposal of the marshal did not suit him. The president spoke out against the marshal's idea. Lloyd George also declined to discuss the proposal. Under these conditions, Clemenceau had no choice but to abandon the marshal's plan, and Pichon even made a proposal "that the meetings continue without the participation of the military, who should retire ».

Opening of the conference. The conference, which was to present the peace treaty of Germany, opened on the same day, January 18, and in the same hall of mirrors at Versailles, where the creation of the German Empire was proclaimed 48 years ago. In a grand speech at the opening of the meeting, President Poincaré demanded sanctions against the perpetrators of the war and guarantees against new aggression. Recalling that the German Empire was proclaimed in the meeting hall at one time, seizing two French provinces, Poincaré said:

“Through the fault of its founders, it was vicious in its very origin. She had the germ of death within her. Born in injustice, she ended her existence in dishonor."

The attack was directed, one might say, directly on the forehead: France, in the person of Poincaré, immediately put forward a program for the dismemberment of Germany. But the other delegates of the big countries did not support the French position: they had their own plans. Wilson recommended that the question of the League of Nations be considered first. He made his proposal after the meeting of the Council of Ten on January 12th. Several times later Wilson returned to the League of Nations. The rest of the Council of Ten hesitated. They were afraid that the adoption of the charter of the League of Nations might complicate the subsequent solution of territorial and financial problems. So before the plenum the question of the League of Nations was not decided.

The plenum of the peace conference approved the rules of work, elected Clemenceau as president, and Lansing, Lloyd George, Orlando and Saionji as vice-presidents of the conference.

Four days after the plenum there were lengthy discussions in the Council of Ten. Wilson insisted that the charter of the League of Nations and the peace treaty should form a single and inseparable whole, binding on all. Lloyd George agreed only to the inclusion of the Charter of the League of Nations in the peace treaty. The French proposed not to link the League of Nations with the peace treaty. In the English proposal, in a disguised form, and in the French more explicitly, the League of Nations was somehow or other separated from the peace treaty. Finally, they decided to refer the question of the League of Nations to a special commission. By referring the question of the League of Nations to a commission, the diplomats of France and England hoped to remove it from the agenda for a long time to come. Moreover, they tried to make the commission as cumbersome as possible in order to delay its work. The French and British proposed to include representatives of small nations in the commission. In vain Wilson insisted on the creation of a small commission. In reply; Lloyd George kept repeating: if the League of Nations should become a shield of small peoples, they should be admitted to the commission. Clemenceau assured that the great powers would prove their readiness to cooperate with the small nations if they opened the doors of the commission to them. So insistently they included in the commission representatives of small peoples, who were so scornfully not allowed to take part in the actual work of the peace conference.

Wilson understood that they wanted to impede the work of the commission in every possible way, and for his part made a diplomatic move. The President announced that he was taking over the chairmanship of the commission. It has been called the "Hotel Crillon Commission".

On January 25, at the plenary session of the conference, Wilson stated his thesis: the League of Nations should be an integral part of the entire peace treaty. The Peace Conference accepted Wilson's proposal. The President plunged into the work of the Crillon Hotel Commission.

Having got rid of the question of the League of Nations for the time being, the conference participants decided to move on to other problems. “The Eastern and colonial questions are less complicated,” Lloyd George assured, proposing to discuss the fate of the colonies taken from Germany, and at the same time the Turkish possessions.

The ego was supported primarily by the British dominions, who all the time demanded an immediate division of the colonies. The representative of New Zealand has explicitly stated that he is an enthusiastic fan of the League of Nations. However, fearing to “overburden” it, he recommended first dividing the colonies, and then giving full control to the League of Nations. Even the day before, Japan, in preliminary negotiations, also expressed its consent to raising the question of colonies. Italian Prime Minister Orlando did not mind. Lloyd George could thus hope to accept his offer. However, he was mistaken: the colonial question was not at all easy. Everyone agreed that the colonies should not be returned to Germany. Wilson noted this unanimity by declaring: "Everyone is against the return of the German colonies." But what to do with them? This issue has caused controversy. Each of the major countries immediately presented its long-considered claims. France demanded the division of Togo and Cameroon. Japan hoped to secure the Shandong Peninsula and the German islands in the Pacific. Italy also spoke of its colonial interests. The French hinted that the treaties concluded during the war had already resolved a number of issues. Everyone understood that there are secret agreements between countries. That which had been hidden so carefully broke through.

With this turn of affairs, the League of Nations was already on the sidelines. Meanwhile, for Wilson the question of the League of Nations was above all a matter of his personal honor. Although the president himself, according to his historiographer Becker, did not own a single idea - all were borrowed from others - the president nevertheless worked hard to create a charter, and the whole world associated the League of Nations with the name of Wilson. The masses are tired of the war. They did not want to hear about new military hardships. Peace was demanded in all countries, in all sections of the population. A pacifist wave has swept over the peoples. Entire libraries have been written about the League of Nations. Pacifist elements sowed peaceful illusions among the broad masses. The League of Nations was seen as the only guarantee of peace. When Wilson got off the ship in Brest, he saw a huge banner, where it was written: "Glory to Wilson the Just!". It was extremely difficult to get around the League of Nations in such a state of mind. To give in on the question of the League of Nations meant for Wilson to lose all his halo. But, of course, it was not so much a matter of Wilson's personal prestige. The League of Nations was to be the vehicle by which America could obtain the billions it had lent to Europe. The League of Nations could become America's leverage in Europe. Wilson therefore forced the conference again to turn to the question of the League of Nations. “The world will say that the great powers first divided the defenseless parts of the world, and then created an alliance of peoples,” Wilson said.

The President insisted that the issue of German colonies and Turkish territory occupied by the Allies be resolved within the framework of the League of Nations. He suggested that the guardianship of these territories should be entrusted to the advanced nations who were willing and able, by their experience and geographical position, to assume such responsibility; Wilson proposed to carry out this guardianship on the basis of the mandates of the League of Nations. All members of the Council of Ten opposed the principle of mandates. Lloyd George put forward the demand of the English dominions - to consider the territories occupied by them during the war, conquered and included in the corresponding dominions. Wilson objected. Then the Prime Minister of England invited representatives of the dominions themselves to the meetings of the Council of Ten to demonstrate their claims. But even this maneuver made no impression on Wilson.

Convinced of the intransigence of the President, the British and French demanded, if the principle of mandates be adopted, that they be immediately distributed among the countries. Wilson did not yield on this issue either. He insisted that first it was necessary to develop and approve the charter of the League of Nations.

Negotiations began between individual members of the Council of Ten. Council meetings were held in a tense atmosphere. Between Wilson and other members of the Council there were continuous bickering. Someone announced in the press what was secretly said at the meeting of the Council of Ten; someone told about Wilson's fights with other delegates. Ironic articles appeared about Wilson's idealism: it was argued that the president himself did not know how to turn his ideas into reality. The irritated president demanded an end to the newspaper hype; if it continues, he will be forced to make an exhaustive public presentation of his views. “It seemed,” House wrote in his diary on January 30, 1919, “that everything went to dust ... The President was angry, Lloyd George was angry, and Clemenceau was angry. For the first time, the president lost his temper when negotiating with them ... ".

There were rumors that Wilson was leaving the conference.

The conference has just begun - and has already cracked. The threat of Wilson's departure alarmed everyone. The meeting seemed to have reached an impasse, but then Lloyd George was found: he argued that the League of Nations was recognized as an integral part of the peace treaty; the development of separate provisions of the charter will not change this fact; this means that it is possible, without waiting for the final development of the charter, to immediately begin the distribution of mandates. But Wilson objected: once the colonies were divided, the League of Nations would remain a formal institution; the charter of the League of Nations must first be approved.

No one can know when this complicated procedure for drafting the charter of the League of Nations will end, Lloyd George objected.

To this, Wilson replied that it would take only ten days to complete the commission's work.

But can you do it in ten days? asked Lloyd George.

Yes, Wilson confirmed.

Well, if so, you can wait, - and Lloyd George turned to Clemenceau with a question if he would find it necessary to say something.

Clemenceau stepped into the arena, silently watching the fight until now.

Third extension of the truce.

Clemenceau decided to achieve his goal in a different way. On February 17, the armistice with Germany ended. The negotiation was in the hands of Marshal Foch. Much of what one would like to see in a peace treaty could be introduced into the terms of the armistice - by the way, this is how France has acted up to now. But when the French Prime Minister in the Council of Ten announced the extension of the truce and hinted that its terms would be revised again, Wilson spoke out against it. Clemenceau insisted with ardor. The single combat between the French prime minister and Wilson began. In the end, Wilson succeeded in gaining the upper hand on this issue as well. It was decided to extend the truce, leaving basically the same conditions. The only thing that Wilson yielded to was the question of the disarmament of Germany: the president did not object to the acceleration of disarmament.

Marshal Foch left for Trier. On February 14, negotiations began there for the third time to extend the truce. Foch demanded that the Germans meet the old conditions, pointing out what had not been met, and along the way putting forward additional requirements. The marshal insisted that Germany stop the offensive against the Poles in Posen, East Prussia and Upper Silesia and that Poznan, a significant part of Central Silesia and all of Upper Silesia be cleared of German troops.

At first glance, this demand did not violate Wilson's instructions: it seemed to be only a refinement of the previous negotiations on Danzig. In fact, it was a new, independent requirement. The cleansing of Posen and Silesia predetermined the fate of these areas: it was clear that France was going to give them to the Poles.

The chairman of the German delegation, Erzberger, protested. He said that Germany had almost finished demobilization, that only 200 thousand people remained under arms. Erzberger rebelled against the further disarmament of Germany. He demanded the return of German prisoners of war. He insisted on sending food to Germany, reminding Foch that in 1871 Bismarck, at the request of the French government, delivered bread to the starving population of Paris. “Despair is the mother of Bolshevism,” Erzberger threatened, “Bolshevism is a bodily and mental illness due to hunger. The best medicine is bread and law…”

In Berlin, Foch's new demands caused alarm. At first, they wanted to categorically refuse to purify Poznań and Upper Silesia. Foreign Minister Brockdorff-Rantzau even submitted his resignation. But in Berlin there were unofficial representatives of the United States. They met with trusted representatives of the German government. The Germans, apparently, were informed that the question of Upper Silesia had not yet been resolved at a peace conference and was unlikely to be resolved in the Polish spirit. The German government decided to sign Foch's demand, hoping that it would not have to be fulfilled, Brockdorf remained in his post.

The truce was concluded for a short, indefinite period, with a three-day warning in case of a break. As regards the question of Poland, the victory formally remained with France; the Germans were to abandon all offensive operations against the Poles in Posen and in all other areas. It was decided to appoint a subcommittee to establish the Polish demarcation line and to implement the agreement on the cleansing of these areas. In fact, the Germans sabotaged the implementation of the treaty; they never cleared a single part of Silesia. Wilson himself later characterized Germany's tactics in the Senate as follows: "accept on principle and reject in fact." By the way, the subcommittee itself was subsequently withdrawn without any protests from the Entente, which was busy with the Paris Conference.

The adoption of the statute of the League of Nations.

Meanwhile, the Crillon Hotel Commission was busy at work. Wilson was in a hurry to complete the Charter of the League of Nations by the deadline. It was not easy: every point was controversial. The commission appointed by the plenum for the development of the charter worked from 3 to 13 February; in total it had ten meetings. Before the official opening of the commission, and then in the course of its work, there were private meetings. The Americans were negotiating with the British, then with the Italians, then with both. A lengthy discussion was caused by the question of whose draft charter to base the discussion on. Wilson pushed for the American project; the British put forward their own. After long hesitation, the president proposed to take as a basis the joint Anglo-American project, agreed upon at a number of private meetings.

With great difficulty, Wilson achieved the acceptance of the principle of mandates. Lansing later explained what argument played a decisive role in this. It was argued that if the German colonies were annexed, the Germans would demand that their value be included in the repayment of indemnity; the mandate principle made it possible to take away the colonies from Germany without any compensation.

The French delegate Léon Bourgeois demanded the creation of an international army that would operate under the operational control of the League of Nations. Without this, the French argued, the League would lose all practical significance, and the charter could turn into a theoretical treatise.

The French proposal by no means intended to make the League of Nations an instrument of collective struggle against aggression. kro, the goal was to consolidate the military predominance of France over Germany and thus establish French hegemony on the European continent. This desire was confirmed by the fact that the delegates of France objected to the entry of Germany into the League of Nations; apparently they were plotting to turn the League into an anti-German alliance. Neither Britain nor the United States wanted this. The debate dragged on. Having met with a united bloc of all partners, the French offered to create at least an international headquarters for the League of Nations. However, this project did not find a favorable response. The French retreated.

A sharp clash was caused by the proposal of the Japanese to introduce into Article 21 of the charter, which stated the equality of religions, also the thesis of the equality of races. Japanese diplomacy was hypocritical. She herself was imbued with the spirit of racism. In this case, she only needed to achieve the abolition of those restrictions against Japanese immigration that were established in the United States and in the dominions of England. The Americans would very much like to support Japan in order to have her on their side against England. However, racial equality also meant equality between black and white; of course, such a declaration would have made it more difficult for the already dubious ratification of the League of Nations charter by the American Senate.

Day after day, the Japanese knocked first on the Americans, then on the British, seeking the adoption of their amendment. Finally, they found a way out in omitting the entire article 21, which spoke about religious equality. Thus, the Japanese were forced to withdraw their offer for a while.

On February 1919, the draft charter was finally ready.

February, the same day that Marshal Foch began negotiations for an extension of the armistice, Wilson, in a solemn ceremony, reported the statute of the League of Nations to the peace conference. “The veil of distrust and intrigue has fallen,” the president concluded, “people look each other in the face and say: we are brothers, and we have a common goal. We did not realize this before, but now we have realized this report. And here is our treaty of brotherhood and friendship.”

Representatives of different countries spoke one after another. Everyone congratulated mankind on the creation of the “instrument of peace”. True, Leon Bourgeois, whose draft was rejected, said that the charter of the League of Nations should be subject to changes and additions. The representative of Gejas also stated that there are "not entirely clear" expressions in the charter. What is meant by the word "mandate", he asked. Nobody answered him. The plenary session of the peace conference approved the president's project. The next day, Wilson, accompanied by a cannon salute, left Europe.

Discussing the terms of peace.

With the approval of the charter of the League of Nations, the motive that hindered the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty disappeared. The Council of Ten began to work. Its composition has changed somewhat. Lloyd George has gone to London. Orlando went with a report to Rome. Clemenceau was bedridden by an anarchist shot. It may not have been accidental that the heads of government left Paris: they were replaced by foreign ministers, and this emphasized the business-like nature of the conference. The representative of England, Lord Balfour, proposed to discuss the main questions of the world - about the borders of Germany, about compensation for her losses, etc. It would be necessary to finish the discussion no later than mid-March. Baron Mackinac asked if the issue of colonies was included in the concept of "Germany's frontier." He was answered in the affirmative. Various items of peace conditions appeared on the table. The interested countries defended their projects. Passions flared up.

How heated the atmosphere can be judged by the demands of the Persian delegation. Persia did not participate in the war, but was on the list of powers invited to join the League of Nations. The Persian delegation arrived in Paris and presented to the conference a memorandum signed by Foreign Minister Moshaver el-Memalek. Referring to "historical rights" allegedly dating back to the 16th-18th centuries, the Persian government demanded that Persia be granted no more than almost half of the Caucasus, including all of Azerbaijan with the city of Baku, Russian Armenia, Nakhichevan, Nagorno-Karabakh and even part of Dagestan with the city, Derbent, as well as a vast territory beyond the Caspian Sea, extending north to the Aral Sea, and east to the Amu Darya with the cities of Merv, Ashgabat, Krasnovodsk, Khiva, and others. In total, all these areas amounted to over 578 thousand square kilometers. In addition, the Persian government also claimed large Turkish territories. It is difficult to assume that such claims were the fruit of the desires of Persian politicians alone. Apparently, behind the back of Persia was a certain major power. In any case, the demands of Persia give an idea of ​​the atmosphere that was created at the Paris Conference.

There was no issue around which the diplomatic struggle would not boil. Japan demanded Shandong, which was sharply opposed by China. Since we have declared war on Germany, then all the areas captured by her must be returned to us, the delegates of China repeated. The British were inclined to support Japan, but the Americans stood up for China.

The French demanded that Germany be dealt with as soon as possible in order to deal with the Russian question. Marshal Foch argued that the Allies could lose the war if they did not solve the Russian problem: this could happen when Germany settled relations with Russia in its own interests or itself became a victim of Bolshevism. According to House, the marshal, in order to fight Bolshevik Russia, was "ready to cooperate with Germany, after signing a preliminary peace treaty, believing that such cooperation could be very valuable ».

Clemenceau demanded to move the French border to the Rhine, and to create an independent republic from the Rhine provinces, deprived of armed force and the right to reunite with Germany, Wilson, who was in the United States, answered with a categorical refusal. The French agreed to make a concession: they offered to create the Republic of the Rhine only for a limited time, after which it would be possible to allow the population to determine their own fate. Wilson did not accept this proposal.

Of course, by mid-March, the discussions on peace terms had not been completed. By this time, Wilson had returned from America. He was bombarded with requests and statements. Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece, Albania handed over to him their memorandums demanding that their requests be met. Without warning either England or France, Wilson gave an interview about the inseparability of the charter of the League of Nations and the peace treaty. He will achieve this continuity, Wilson added emphatically.

However, Wilson himself returned from America by no means a triumph. A number of senators opposed US participation in the League, fearing American involvement in European affairs. Increasingly, voices were heard in the press that Wilson had violated the Monroe Doctrine. The passage of the League of Nations charter into law required the approval of the US Senate by at least a two-thirds majority; meanwhile, the opposition in the Senate was growing stronger and stronger. Upon returning to Paris, Wilson began to receive disturbing telegrams about the agitation of his opponents. They demanded the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations.

In Europe, Wilson's difficulties were known. “The president's ideas have conquered Europe,” wrote one prominent historian. “We have to wait…whether Wilson’s ideas will conquer America!” Therefore, Wilson's outcry had no effect on the conference. Annoyingly shrugging off the annoying question, the delegates of the major countries continued to insist on the implementation of their programs. Clomanceau demanded a strategic border along the Rhine and the creation of an independent state from the German provinces on the left bank of the Rhine, in the extreme case under the protectorate of the League of Nations. The French imperialists toyed with a plan to combine Lorraine ore with Ruhr coal. Marshal Fot spoke about the danger of Bolshevism threatening Poland. He demanded the creation of a "great Poland" with the transfer of Poznan and Danzig to it. At the same time, the French were not at all touched by the interests of Poland. They were not going to defend her needs. The French imperialists wanted to create a counterbalance to Germany and Soviet Russia. In the midst of the debate, Clemenceau bluntly stated: "When the question of the formation of the Polish state was raised, it was meant not only to make amends for one of the greatest crimes of history, but also to create a barrier between Germany and Russia ...".

Wilson understood this - just look at the pages of the book of his historiographer Becker. But the creation of Poland on the French model meant the strengthening of France in Europe. Neither America nor England agreed to this. “There is no need to create a new Alsace-Lorraine,” said Lloyd George. Clemenceau insisted on his own, threatening to leave the conference.

However, in defending his claims, Clemenceau made a mistake. Justifying his program, he insisted that the security of France required it. Denying him a Rhine frontier, Lloyd George and Wilson offered to guarantee French frontiers in return, pledging to provide immediate assistance to France if Germany attacked her. Clemenceau knew that in America they demanded the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations. In this case, American guarantees would have no real value, because the Monroe Doctrine forbade the use of American troops outside America. Clemenceau tried to correct his oversight. On March 17, he sent a note to Wilson and Lloyd George agreeing to accept guaranteed aid from both countries. As for the Rhine provinces, Clemenceau proposed to separate the left bank of the Rhine from Germany in the political and economic sense and to establish the occupation of the left bank provinces by the inter-allied armed forces for 30 years. At the same time, Clemenceau set the condition that the left bank and the fifty-kilometer zone on the right bank of the Rhine would be completely demilitarized.

As compensation for his concession on the Rhine question, Clemenceau demanded that the Saar Basin be handed over to France. If this does not happen, he argued, Germany, owning coal, will actually control all French metallurgy.

In response to Clemenceau's new demand, Wilson said with annoyance that he had never heard of the Saar until now. In his temper, Clemenceau called Wilson a Germanophile. He bluntly declared that no French prime minister would sign a treaty that would not condition the return of the Saar to France.

“So, if France does not get what she wants,” the president remarked in an icy tone, “she will refuse to act together with us. In that case, would you like me to return home?”

"I don't want you to come home," Clemenceau replied, "I intend to do it myself."

With these words, Clemenceau hurried out of the president's office.

The crisis in relations between France and the United States was supplemented by a sharp aggravation of contradictions between the United States and Britain, as well as between France and Britain on the question of the division of Turkey. On March 20, the prime ministers and foreign ministers of France, England, the United States and Italy gathered at the apartment of Lloyd George. On the wall of Lloyd George's office hung a large map of Asiatic Turkey; it depicted in various colors the territories that go to the victorious countries. The French foreign minister laid out the whole story of the partition of Turkey, insisting on French demands. Then Lloyd George spoke. He stated that England fielded up to a million soldiers against Turkey, and insisted on his project. Wilson, by his own admission, was the first to hear about the Sike-Picot treaty. "It sounds like a new tea company: Saike - Pico," the American president said with a touch of disdain. He suggested sending a special commission, consisting of French, British, Italian and American representatives, to find out what the desire of the Syrians themselves was. Clemenceau did not object to the survey, but suggested that Palestine, Mesopotamia and other territories mentioned in the English requirements should also be surveyed.

The outcome of the discussion was fairly aptly defined by Wilson. When asked by House how the meeting with Clemenceau and Lloyd George went, the President replied: "Brilliant - we parted on all issues."

By the way, only the Americans left for Syria without waiting for the British and French experts. Returning, American experts reported that the Syrians want to be independent. Clemenceau made an unimaginable noise in protest against such a proposal. So the question of Syria was not resolved at the peace conference.

Rumors of disagreements between the powers crept into the lobby. Three days later, the newspapers reported on the disputes between France and England, depicting in detail the clash of the premiers. This time, Lloyd George demanded an end to the newspaper blackmail: “If this continues, I will leave. Under such conditions, I cannot work,” he threatened. At the insistence of Lloyd George, all further negotiations were conducted in the Council of Four. From that moment on, the Council of Ten actually gave way to the so-called "big four", which consisted of Lloyd George, Wilson, Clemenceau, Orlando. Japan was not included in it, because it was not represented by the head of government. However, the "big four" was often reduced to the "troika" - Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau. The conference again stalled.

"Document from Fontainebleau".

On March 25, 1919, Lloyd George sent Clemenceau and Wilson a memorandum from the dacha where he usually spent the weekend, entitled "Some remarks for the peace conference before the drafting of the final peace terms." This memorandum is known as the Fontainebleau Document. It outlined the English program and at the same time criticized the French demands. First of all, Lloyd George opposed the dismemberment of Germany. “You can deprive Germany of her colonies,” wrote Lloyd George, “bring her army to the size of a police force and her fleet to the level of the fleet of a power of the fifth rank. Ultimately, it makes no difference: if she finds the peace treaty of 1919 unjust, she will find means to take revenge on the victors ... For these reasons, I strongly object to the exclusion of the German population from Germany in favor of other nations to a greater extent than necessary.

Lloyd George spoke out against the demand of the Polish commission to transfer 2,100,000 Germans under Polish rule, just as he was against the cession of territories inhabited by Hungarians to other states. The following proposals were put forward. The Rhineland remains with Germany, but is demilitarized. Germany returns Alsace-Lorraine to France. Germany cedes to France the border of 1814, or else, in order to compensate France for the destroyed coal mines, the current border of Alsace-Lorraine, as well as the right to exploit the coal mines of the Saar basin for ten years. Malmedy and Moreno go to Belgium, and certain parts of the territory of Schleswig go to Denmark. Germany renounces all her rights to the former German colonies and to the leased area of ​​Qiao Chao.

As for the eastern borders of Germany, Poland receives the Danzig Corridor, however, in such a way that it covers as few territories with a German population as possible.

Having put an end to France's territorial claims, the British Prime Minister spoke out against excessive demands on the question of reparations as well. “I insisted,” wrote Lloyd George, “that only the generation that participated in the war be burdened with reparation payments.” Germany pays annually for a certain number of years a certain amount, which is fixed by the victorious powers; however, the amount of reparations must be consistent with the ability of Germany to pay. The amounts received from Germany are distributed in the following proportion: 50% - to France, 30% - to Great Britain and 20% - to the other powers.

Finally, in order to limit the military power of France, Lloyd George proposed that the question of disarmament be discussed. True, this concerned primarily Germany and small countries: the five winners retained their armed forces until Germany and Russia proved their peacefulness. In exchange for agreeing to start negotiations on disarmament, Lloyd George offered France joint guarantees from Britain and the United States against a possible German attack.

The "Fontainebleau Document" caused the French Prime Minister to literally have a fit of rage. Clemenceau entrusted the compilation of the answer to his closest collaborator Tardieu, but was dissatisfied with his project and began to compose a note to Lloyd George himself. The French Premier sarcastically remarked that the British Premier was proposing to place moderate territorial demands on Germany, but said nothing about concessions connected with Germany's naval position. “If it is necessary,” Clemenceau replied, “to show special indulgence towards Germany, one should offer her colonial, maritime compensation, as well as the expansion of her sphere of trade influence.”

In conclusion, Clemenceau noted that the maritime and colonial powers, i.e., England in the first place, would benefit from Lloyd George's plan, because the colonies were taken from Germany, the fleet was disarmed, merchant ships were issued, and the continental powers would remain unsatisfied. Clemenceau thus refused all concessions and concessions.

The British Prime Minister did not remain in debt. “Judging by the memorandum,” Lloyd George wrote in response, “France apparently does not attach any importance to the rich German colonies in Africa, which she has mastered, She does not attach any importance either to Syria, or to confusion, or compensation, despite the fact that in the matter of compensation she is repeatedly given priority ... She does not attach importance to the fact that she acquires German ships instead of French ships sunk by German submarines, and also receives part of the German navy ... "

“In reality, France is concerned only with taking Danzig from the Germans and handing it over to the Poles,” wrote Lloyd George. Since France considers that the English proposals are acceptable only to naval powers, Lloyd George takes them back.

“I was under the illusion,” continued the British Prime Minister, “that France attaches importance to colonies, ships, compensation, disarmament, Syria and the British guarantee to help France with all its might if it is attacked. I regret my mistake and will make sure it doesn't happen again." In conclusion, Lloyd George announced that he was withdrawing his offer to provide France with the coal mines of the Saar.

The prime ministers' correspondence was handed over to Wilson. The meetings of the Council of Four began again. Wilson supported Lloyd George on the Saar issue. Having met with a united front of both powers, Clemenceau decided to change his demand: he offered to transfer the Saar region to the League of Nations, which in turn would give France a mandate for it for 15 years. After this period, a plebiscite will be held in the region, which will decide the future fate of the Saar. But this proposal of Clemenceau was also rejected. Wilson only agreed to sending experts to the Saar to find out how France could be given the exploitation of the mines without political dominance in the Saar.

Wilson also spoke out against the secession of the Rhineland from Germany, even against its prolonged occupation by the French. But he promised, together with England, to guarantee the borders of France and to help her in the event of a German attack.

Contribution problem.

The question of reparations was discussed with the same vehemence. How much can be taken from Germany - experts puzzled over this. The British Commission, chaired by the Australian Prime Minister Hughes, set a figure of 24 billion pounds sterling, almost 480 billion gold marks. Lloyd George called this figure "a wild and fantastic chimera", although he himself promised at election meetings in England to "turn out the pockets of the Germans." The French demanded 3 billion pounds (60 billion gold marks) for the restoration of the northeastern departments, while according to statistics, the national wealth of all France in 1917 was only 2.4 billion pounds.

The Americans feared that Clemenceau and Lloyd George would kill the golden goose. After all, the United States could receive debts from England and France only if Germany was solvent. The American expert Davis considered it possible to demand only 25 billion dollars from the Germans.

The same disputes aroused the question of the distribution of reparations among the winners. Lloyd George proposed to give 50% of the total amount to France, England - 30% and other countries - 20%. France insisted on 58% for themselves and 25% for England. After much debate, Clemenceau announced that the last word for the French was 56% for France and 25% for England. Wilson offered 56% and 28%.

In the end, American experts proposed not to fix the figures for the indemnity, but to entrust this to a special reparation commission, which would have to present the final demands to the German government no later than May 1, 1921. The French seized on this proposal, assuming in the future through the commission to achieve the implementation of their plan. On other issues, no agreement was reached. Clemenceau again began to threaten to leave, which could cause a government crisis and the resignation of the prime minister. Wilson, for his part, summoned the George Washington steamer from America. The peace conference hung in the balance. It could be saved only by making mutual concessions.

On April 14, Clemenceau informed the president, who had not yet recovered from his illness, through House, that he agreed to the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter of the League of Nations. For this, the Americans must, in turn, make concessions: transfer the mandate to the Saarland to France, allow Anglo-French troops to occupy the left bank of the Rhine for 15 years as a guarantee of Germany's fulfillment of the terms of the peace treaty, demilitarize the Rhine provinces, as well as a zone 50 kilometers wide on the right bank of the Rhine.

Wilson, who was experiencing great anxiety in connection with the agitation of his political opponents in America, was delighted with Clemenceau's proposal. He stated that he was ready to reconsider his categorical "no" on the Saar and Rhine issues. Colonel House informed Clemenceau of Wilson's reply. Clemenceau was delighted: he embraced the colonel. House immediately asked Clemenceau to stop attacking Wilson in French newspapers. Now the "tiger" was given the necessary order. On the morning of April 16, the Paris newspapers were full of praises for Wilson.

The agreement seemed to have been reached. How unexpected it was can be judged by the fact that in the commission where the Charter of the League of Nations was discussed, French experts still spoke out against the inclusion of the Monroe Doctrine in the charter; they did not yet know about the Clemenceau-Wilson deal.

It remained to persuade the British to join Wilson's concessions. The American delegation conducted parallel negotiations with the British. They wanted the United States to give up competition in naval arms. Eventually, they were given appropriate verbal assurances. Then the British decided to support Wilson. On April 22, Lloyd George announced that he joined the President's position on the Rhine and Saar questions.

Establishment of the League of Nations.

A delighted Wilson was finally given the opportunity to present the final charter of the League of Nations at the plenary session of the conference on 28 April. Leon Bourgeois proposed the creation of a military body under the League of Nations; Hymans, the Belgian delegate, began to express regret that Brussels had not been chosen as the seat of the League of Nations. Suddenly, Clemenceau broke off the debate: he declared that the proposal of the President of the United States, due to the absence of objections, was adopted unanimously. Clemenceau spoke French; he spoke quickly; the translators were silent. Most of those present did not understand him, and many did not hear him. Only after Clemenceau had moved on to the next item on the agenda did the conference learn with bewilderment that it had "adopted unanimously" the charter of the League of Nations.

The controversial issue of the Monroe Doctrine, which had so worried Wilson, was formulated as follows:

"Article 21. International obligations, such as treaties of arbitration, and limited to eternal areas of agreement, such as the Monroe Doctrine, which ensure the preservation of peace, shall not be considered inconsistent with any of the provisions of this statute."

According to the statute of the League of Nations, its founders were the states that participated in the war against Germany, as well as the newly formed states (Gedzhas, Poland, Czechoslovakia).

The second group of states consisted of countries invited to immediately join the League of Nations: Argentina, Venezuela, Denmark, Spain, Colombia, the Netherlands, Norway, Paraguay, Persia, El Salvador, Chile, Switzerland, Sweden. In November - December 1920 they all joined the League of Nations.

Switzerland, upon accession, made a reservation about maintaining its permanent neutrality, in view of which the Council of the League of Nations recognized its “exceptional position” and indicated that Switzerland participates in the military actions of the League only with economic assistance.

The third category included all other states of the world. For their admission to the membership of the League of Nations, the consent of two-thirds of the votes of the Assembly of the League of Nations and the unanimous decision of the Council was necessary.

The main organs of the League of Nations were the Assembly of all representatives of the members of the League and the Council, which included a permanent Secretariat. Each member of the League had one vote in the general meeting of the League: thus, the British Empire had 6 votes with the dominions, and since 1923 - together with Ireland - 7 votes. The Council of the League of Nations, according to the original statute, consisted of 9 members: 5 permanent (Great Britain, Italy, USA, France, Japan) and 4 temporary, changing annually. The first provisional members of the Council of the League of Nations were Greece, Spain, Belgium, and Brazil. Since the United States did not join the League of Nations, because the Senate did not approve the Treaty of Versailles, the Council actually had 8 members.

The League of Nations recognized that any war "interests the League as a whole" and the latter must take all measures to preserve peace. At the request of any member of the League, a Council is immediately convened. In the event of a conflict between the members of the League of Nations, they submit it to arbitration or to the Council and do not resort to war until a period of three months has elapsed after the decision of the court or the report of the Council.

If a member of the League resorts to war contrary to the obligations assumed, then the other members undertake to immediately break off all commercial and financial relations with him, and the Council must invite the various governments concerned to send one or another contingent of troops "destined to maintain respect for the obligations of the League." However, the obligations of the League of Nations to curb the aggressors were outlined so vaguely that, in essence, they were reduced to zero.

The article on disarmament was formulated with the same vagueness. The League of Nations declared it necessary "to limit national armaments to the minimum compatible with national security and with the fulfillment of international obligations imposed by common action." The Council was asked, taking into account the “geographical position and special conditions of each state”, to prepare plans for the limitation of armaments and submit them for consideration by the governments concerned. But only. The governments concerned could ignore such a recommendation.

With regard to mandates, they were divided into three categories. The first included those Turkish regions which "have reached such a degree of development that their existence as independent nations can be temporarily recognized." The powers that have received a mandate over this category of areas will govern them until the moment when the countries under mandate are able to govern themselves. Of course, the date and conditions for the onset of such a moment have not been determined.

The second category included areas of Central Africa, which are governed by mandate holders on the terms of the prohibition of the trade in slaves, weapons, alcohol, the preservation of freedom of conscience and religion of the subject population.

The third category included the colonies in South-West Africa and certain islands in the South Pacific, which are governed by the laws of the Mandatory State as an integral part of its territory.

The very distribution of mandates was not provided for by the charter of the League of Nations; that was what the peace conference was supposed to do.

Finally, the International Labor Office was organized under the League of Nations. Countries not invited to the League of Nations could be included in the labor bureau, which thus turned into a kind of test committee for those wishing to be admitted to the League.

Claims by Italy and Japan.

So the agreement was reached. The Charter of the League of Nations was adopted. It remains to finish the discussion of the terms of the peace treaty. All 58 commissions of the Paris Conference were hastily completing their work. Again and again disputes flared up on this or that issue. So, the British and Americans demanded the destruction of submarines. "They should be outlawed," Wilson said. But the French insisted on the division of German submarines between the allies. In conclusion, Germany was deprived of its submarines: they went into service with the victors.

The question of the prohibition of the use of poison gases caused similar disagreements. Germany undertook to inform the Allies of the method of making gases. But the requirement to organize supervision over the chemical industry in Germany was withdrawn on the pretext that the production of gases is closely connected with the entire chemical industry, therefore the disclosure of military secrets is unthinkable without the disclosure of commercial and technical secrets. Thus, having stopped before the inviolability of the private property of the German owners of the chemical industry, in which some Americans were also interested, the peace conference left in the hands of the Germans the strongest and most dangerous weapon of war.

With a sin in half settled the main issues. It was already possible to invite the Germans to acquaint them with the preliminary terms of the treaty. But here the poorly built building of the peace conference began to tremble again: the Italian Prime Minister Orlando sharply opposed the invitation of Germany. He kept waiting for the claims of Italy to be dealt with. He supported the great powers on the principle of "do ut des" - "I give so that you give." But they forgot about Italy. Now Orlando spoke. He insisted not only on the fulfillment of the promises made by the secret London Treaty in April 1915. He went further and demanded the city of Fiume, which was never intended for Italy. The rest of the great powers did not want to hear about the implementation of the London Treaty. Fiume was also planned to be transferred to Yugoslavia.

Italian diplomats, as usual, played a double game. Orlando urged Lloyd George and Clemenceau that the Treaty of London should remain in effect. Thus, Orlando seemed to agree with that clause of the London Treaty, according to which Fiume was not intended for Italy. At the same time, Orlando told Wilson that the London Agreement was not binding on the United States and that Fiume should be handed over to Italy. Soon the double game of the Italians was revealed. Wilson persisted. Orlando said that without Fiume he could not return home: the Italians would raise indignation. To this, the president threw him: “I know the Italians better than you!”. On April 23, Wilson addressed an appeal to the Italian people, demanding generosity from them. In the Council of Four, Wilson proposed to turn Fiume into an independent state under the control of the League of Nations. Orlando left the peace conference the next day. But having left Paris, he still left his expert there. A storm of indignation against Wilson was staged in Rome. The newspapers have forgotten what they wrote some time ago about Wilson the Just. Now they called him the cause of all the misfortunes of Italy.

On the day of Orlando's departure, April 24, the Japanese suddenly came out. They demanded a settlement of the Shandong issue "with a minimum of delay"; if this demand is not met, they will not sign the treaty. The Japanese very well chose the moment for their speech. Italy's departure from the conference has already dealt her some blow. It was obvious that if Japan also followed Orlando, the conference might collapse. As is well known, Wilson already once failed the Japanese demand for recognition of the equality of races; to oppose the Japanese again seemed to the president too obvious a diplomatic inconvenience.

Wilson hesitated. But England took the side of Japan. Lloyd George advised the President to relent. The Japanese, in turn, announced their intention to return Shandong to China in the future. In the end, Wilson gave in: despite his repeated promises to help China, he agreed to hand over Shandong to Japan.

Yielding to Japan, the Allied diplomats took revenge on Italy. Taking advantage of the departure of Orlando, the Council of Three allowed the Greeks to occupy Smyrna, which, according to a secret treaty, was intended for Italy. On the other hand, Italy, on the verge of financial collapse, continued to negotiate with America for a loan. Fearing that the conference would sign peace with the Germans without Italy, Orlando - already without any noise - returned to Paris.

German delegation and peace conference.

The German delegates were invited to Versailles on 25 April. The telegram emphasized that German delegates were being summoned to receive the text of the preliminary peace. The German Foreign Minister, Count Brockdorff-Rantzau, replied that he was sending delegates who would be empowered to adopt the draft treaty and hand it over to the German government. In order to set off the offensive tone of the answer, Brockdorf named several delegates, including two clerical employees. Clemenceau realized that he had gone too far: in a new telegram, he asked to send a delegation empowered to discuss all issues related to the world. On April 28, a special train with a German delegation headed by Brockdorf-Rantzau left Berlin.

In Germany, they knew about the differences in the Entente camp. Quartermaster General Trainer tried to establish contact with England and America, acting through figureheads. Ludendorff, through his agents, suggested that Clemenceau create a special German army to fight Soviet Russia. Erzberger also maintained relations with the French, with whom he developed a plan for the restoration of Belgium and Northern France through the hands of German workers. Orders were to be divided between French and German industrialists, and all work was to be carried out under the supervision and on the instructions of the French Control Commission.

The German Foreign Minister, in turn, tried to establish contacts with representatives of England and especially America. In a word, Germany tried to exploit as widely as possible the contradictions in the camp of her opponents.

In anticipation of an invitation, Germany set up several commissions to prepare its counter-draft. There they studied the debate at the peace conference, got acquainted with the mood of the governments. German agents elicited from the representatives of small countries the details of the negotiations in the Council of Four. Therefore, they knew that it was about Alsace-Lorraine, about Schleswig, Danzig.

There were frequent meetings of the German government. General Coach insisted on preserving the army at all costs. Just before Brockdorf's departure, the Trainer, accompanied by three generals and staff officers, came to him on behalf of Hindenburg. The coach warned against surrender. He protested against the recognition of Germany as the culprit of the war, because such recognition would entail the extradition of the generals, and the army had to be preserved under all and any conditions.

Germany's opponents, for their part, negotiated with Germany separately from each other. On the way, the German delegation was visited by a representative of Wilson. He advised Breckdorf to sign a peace treaty. Brockdorf replied that he would not sign anything beyond Wilson's 14 points.

The delegation arrived in Paris on 30 April. Quickly settled in the hotel, hoisted the antenna. They created an apparatus, preparing to start negotiations, but the conference showed no signs of life. Brockdorff-Rantzau discussed the line of his future behavior day and night. Various plans were made depending on how the situation developed.

Only on May 7, 1919, the German delegation was summoned to Versailles. Clemenceau opened the conference session with a short speech. “The hour of reckoning has come,” he said. - You asked us for peace. We agree to provide it to you. We give you the book of the world ». At the same time, Clemenceau stressed that the winners made a solemn decision "to use all the means at their disposal in order to fully achieve the legitimate satisfaction they should follow." The German delegates had previously been told that no oral discussions could be tolerated and that German comments had to be submitted in writing. The Germans were given a period of 15 days during which they could apply for clarifications. After that, the Supreme Council will decide in what time the final answer of the German government should follow.

While Clemenceau's speech was being translated, the secretary of the peace conference, the Frenchman Dutasta, with a thick white book in his hands, approached the table where the German delegation was sitting, and handed over the terms of peace to Brockdorf-Rantzau.

The German minister had two responses prepared for Clemenceau's speech: one in case Clemenceau's speech was correct, and the second in case it was aggressive. Brockdorff-Rantzau chose the second option. “We are required to admit that we are the only culprits of the war,” Brockdorf said. “Such a confession in my mouth would be a lie.”

Germany recognizes the injustice committed by her in relation to Belgium. But only. Not only Germany made a mistake, said Brockdorf. He emphasized that Germany, like all other powers, accepts the 14 Wilson points. Thus, they are binding on both warring camps. He is therefore against excessive reparations. “The ruin and ruin of Germany,” Brockdorf threatened, “would deprive the states entitled to compensation of the benefits they claim, and would entail unimaginable chaos in the whole economic life of Europe. Both the victors and the vanquished must be on the alert to avert this formidable danger with its immeasurable consequences. Brockdorff's speech ended the whole procedure.

For more than two days the Germans studied the terms of peace. Under the first impression, one of the delegates suggested leaving Paris immediately. A protest demonstration was organized in Berlin. On May 12, 1919, President Ebert and Minister Scheidemann made speeches from a balcony to a crowd gathered outside. Scheidemann shouted: "Let their hands wither before they sign such a peace treaty." But Brockdorf was ordered to stay in Paris. He tried to enter into personal negotiations with the leaders of the conference, hoping to achieve a revision of certain clauses of the treaty. The German delegation sent note after note, insisting on softening certain conditions. But Clemenceau invariably refused. The Germans also used their favorite trick here, trying to intimidate opponents with a revolution. Brockdorff-Rantzau suggested that an international workers' congress should be convened at Versailles to discuss issues of labor legislation. Of course, it was not a matter of protecting workers' interests. The Germans wanted to use the labor movement to influence the peace conference. But Clemenceau understood this plan. He refused to conduct any negotiations for a congress.

Telegram after telegram was sent from Berlin protesting against Germany being held responsible for the war. The German delegation stated in the note that it did not recognize only its own country as the culprit of this disaster. After all, it is not for nothing that the peace conference has a "commission to investigate the responsibility of the instigators of the war."

Such a commission has indeed been created. The Germans, having learned about its existence, demanded that they be informed of the results of its work.

Clemenceau caustically replied to the Germans that Germany's incessant desire to shift blame could only be understood if she really felt it behind her. After all, Germany itself in November 1918 declared that it agreed to compensate for all losses that occurred as a result of its attack on land, on water and from the air.

In response to the argument that the new Germany could not be held responsible for the actions of the old government, Clemenceau recalled the year 1871, when Germany did not ask the French Republic if it was willing to be held responsible for the sins of the French monarchy. In the same way, in Brest, Germany forced the new Russia to recognize the obligations of the tsarist government.

On May 20, Count Brockdorf asked for an extension of the deadline for submitting a response. He did not lose hope of playing on the contradictions among the allies and therefore insisted on a delay. He was given 8 days. The German ambassador left for Spa. Representatives of the German government also arrived there. On May 29, Brockdorff-Rantzau presented Clemenceau with a reply note to Germany. “Having read in the said document about the conditions of peace,” wrote Brockdorf, “the demands that the victorious force of the enemy made to us, we were horrified.” Germany protested against all points of the peace conditions and put forward its own counterproposals. The Germans agreed to a 100,000-strong army, but insisted on admitting Germany to the League of Nations. They refused in favor of France from Alsace-Lorraine, demanding, however, that a plebiscite be held there. They expressed their readiness to cede to the Poles a significant part of the Posen province and give Poland access to the open sea. They accepted the transfer of their colonies to the League of Nations, on the condition that Germany also be recognized as entitled to a mandate. As reparations, Germany agreed to pay 100 billion gold marks, of which 20 billion before May 1, 1926. She conceded part of her fleet. With regard to guilt in the war, Germany insisted on the creation of an impartial commission that would investigate this issue.

While the Council of Four was getting acquainted with the German counterproposals, Brockdorf was visited by unofficial representatives of the warring powers. He had both the French and the British. The Germans had the idea that the enemy was ready to make concessions. From some sources, the Germans learned about the differences on the question of disarmament. However, when on May 23 the Council of Four discussed the report of the military experts of the Supreme Council on the limitation of armaments of small states, more than thirty people were present. With such a number, it was tricky to keep the secret!

Shortly before this meeting, military experts were instructed to determine the number of troops of small nations in proportion to the army left to Germany and amounting to 100,000 people. This meant that Austria should have an army of 15,000, Hungary 18,000, Bulgaria 10,000, Czechoslovakia 22,000, Yugoslavia 20,000, Romania 28,000, Poland 44,000 and Greece 12,000.

Germany's allies were not represented at the conference, although Austria had already received an invitation. They could not openly express their protest, but the rest of the countries did not want to hear about such a composition of their armies. The American General Bliss, who made the report, believed that 100,000 people were not enough for Germany, that the army should be increased and, accordingly, the number of troops of small nations should be increased. But Clemenceau sharply opposed the revision of this question. On June 5, representatives of Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Yugoslavia and Greece were invited to a meeting of the Council in Wilson's apartment. At a preliminary meeting, after a lengthy discussion, they worked out a common line of conduct - to refuse to reduce armies. The President's meeting took place in an extremely tense atmosphere. The delegates of the invited countries categorically insisted on the preservation of their armies. In vain they were persuaded by Wilson and Lloyd George. Clemenceau did not speak. The delegates felt his tacit support. The agreement was never reached. The delegates of the smaller countries left the meeting.

Germany was aware of these differences and hoped that they would help her win concessions. But her expectations were not met. On June 16, Brockdorf was handed a new copy of the peace treaty. It was the same thick book, in which some changes were now written in red ink by hand. France renounced its sovereignty in the Saarland in favor of the League of Nations. Five commissioners were appointed to manage the region. A plebiscite was to be held in Upper Silesia. In an accompanying note, Clemenceau stressed that the treaty "must be accepted or rejected as it is presented today." Five days were given for a response. If no answer is received, the Powers will announce that the armistice is at an end and will take such measures as they deem necessary "in order to enforce and fulfill these conditions by force." The only concession was that the Germans, at their insistent request, added another 48 hours to these five days.

The German delegation left for Berlin.

The meetings of the German government began. Some ministers, including Brockdorff-Rantzau, proposed not to sign a peace treaty, hoping that disagreements in the camp of the victors would make it possible to achieve milder conditions. Others insisted on signing a peace treaty, fearing the collapse of the empire. But even those who demanded signing openly said that the conditions should not be met. Hindenburg's opinion was requested. He replied that the army was unable to resist and would be defeated; the army and its supreme headquarters must be preserved at all costs. They secretly negotiated with the French. They made it clear that the Kaiser and the generals would not be touched.

On June 21, the German government announced that it was ready to sign a peace treaty, without recognizing, however, that the German people were responsible for the war. The next day, Clemenceau replied that the allied countries would not agree to any changes in the treaty and to any reservations and demanded either signing the peace or refusing to sign. On June 23, the German National Assembly decided to sign peace without any reservations. The mood was extremely tense. They were afraid that the Entente might launch an offensive. Some deputy, according to Erzberger, worried about the protracted debate, hysterically shouted: “Where is my car? I must go now! French pilots will appear tonight!

On June 28, 1919, the new German Foreign Minister Hermann Müller and Justice Minister Bell signed the Treaty of Versailles.

terms of the Treaty of Versailles.

Under the Treaty of Versailles, Germany undertook to return Alsace-Lorraine to France within the borders of 1870 with all bridges across the Rhine. The coal mines of the Saar basin became the property of France, and the management of the region was transferred to the League of Nations for 15 years, after which the plebiscite was to finally decide on the ownership of the Saar. The left bank of the Rhine was occupied by the Entente for 15 years. The territory 50 kilometers east of the Rhine was completely demilitarized. In the districts of Eupen and Malmedy, a plebiscite was envisaged; as a result of it, they retreated to Belgium. The same applied to the districts of Schleswig-Holstein: they went over to Denmark. Germany recognized the independence of Czechoslovakia and Poland and refused in favor of the first from the Gulchinsky region in the south of Upper Silesia, and in favor of Poland - from some regions of Pomerania, from Poznan, most of West Prussia and part of East Prussia. The question of Upper Silesia was decided by a plebiscite. Danzig with the region passed to the League of Nations, which undertook to make it a free city. It was included in the Polish customs system. Poland received the right to control the railway and river routes of the Danzig corridor. German territory was divided by the Polish Corridor. In general, one eighth of the territory and one twelfth of the population departed from Germany. The Allies occupied all the German colonies. England and France divided Cameroon and Togo among themselves. The German colonies in South West Africa went to the Union of South Africa; Australia got New Guinea and New Zealand got Samoa. A significant part of the German colonies in East Africa was transferred to Great Britain, part - to Belgium, the Kyong triangle - to Portugal. The islands in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator that belonged to Germany, the Kiao-Chao region and the German concessions in Shandong became the possessions of Japan.

Compulsory conscription in Germany was abolished. The army, which consisted of volunteers, was not to exceed 100,000 men, including a contingent of officers not exceeding 4,000 men. The General Staff was dissolved. The term for hiring non-commissioned officers and soldiers was determined at 12 years, and for newly appointed officers - 25 years. All German fortifications were destroyed, with the exception of the southern and eastern ones. The navy was reduced to 6 battleships, 6 light cruisers, 12 destroyers and 12 destroyers. It was forbidden to have a German submarine fleet. The rest of the German warships were to be transferred to the Allies or destroyed. Germany was forbidden to have military and naval aviation and any kind of airships. However, Germany was liberated from occupation. To monitor the implementation of the military terms of the treaty, three international control commissions were created.

The economic terms of the agreement were as follows. By May 1, 1921, a special reparation commission was to determine the amount of indemnity that Germany was obliged to cover within 30 years. Until May 1, 1921, Germany pledged to pay the Allies 20 billion marks in gold, goods, ships and securities. In exchange for the sunken ships, Germany was to provide all of its merchant ships with a displacement of over 1,600 tons, half of the ships over 1,000 tons, one quarter of its fishing vessels and one fifth of its entire river fleet, and within five years build merchant ships for the allies of 200 thousand tons per year. Within 10 years, Germany pledged to supply France with up to 140 million tons of coal, Belgium - 80 million, Italy - 77 million. Germany was supposed to transfer to the Allied Powers half of the entire stock of dyes and chemical products and one-fourth of the future production until 1925. Germany renounced its rights and advantages in China, Siam, Liberia, Morocco, Egypt and agreed to the protectorate of France over Morocco and Great Britain over Egypt. Germany had to recognize the treaties to be concluded with Turkey and Bulgaria. She pledged to renounce Brest-Litovsk, as well as from Bucharest, peace and recognize and respect the independence of all territories that were part of the former Russian Empire by August 1, 1914. Article 116 of the peace treaty recognized Russia's right to receive from Germany the corresponding part of reparations. Germany left its troops in the Baltic republics and in Lithuania until further notice from the allies. In this way, Germany became an accomplice to the intervention in Soviet Russia.

The contradictions of the Versailles system

Treaties signed at Saint Germain, Neuilly and Trianon. Having done away with Germany, the victors began negotiations with her allies. On September 10, 1919, an agreement was signed with Austria at the Saint-Germain Palace. She pledged to transfer to Italy part of the provinces of Extreme and Carinthia, Kustenland and South Tyrol. Yugoslavia received most of Carniola, Dalmatia, southern Styria and southeastern Carinthia. In Klagenfurt, it was decided to hold a plebiscite: it ended in due time in favor of Austria. In order to drive a wedge between Hungary and Austria, Burgenland was taken from the former and given to the latter. Bukovina was given to Romania. Czechoslovakia included Bohemia, Moravia, two communities of Lower Austria and part of Silesia. Austria was forbidden to unite with Germany. Austria received the right to maintain an army of 30 thousand soldiers. Austria handed over its military and merchant fleet to the winners. The Habsburg Empire ceased to exist.

On November 27, 1919, after lengthy negotiations, during which the Bulgarian delegation argued that the war was caused by the policy of Tsar Ferdinand, an agreement was signed with Bulgaria in Neuilly. Dobruja was assigned to Romania. Bulgaria transferred part of its territory to Yugoslavia. Thrace remained in the hands of the winners, who later handed it over to Greece. This cut off Bulgaria from the Aegean Sea. Bulgaria pledged to give the winners the entire fleet and pay an indemnity of 2.5 billion gold francs. Armed forces Bulgaria were defined as 20 thousand people.

Later than others, peace was concluded with Hungary, which was undergoing a revolution. Only on June 4, 1920, in Versailles, in the Great Trianon Palace, an agreement was signed with her. Slovakia and Carpathian Rus were included in Czechoslovakia, Croatia and Slovenia went to Yugoslavia. Romania received Transylvania and Banat, with the exception of the part transferred to Yugoslavia. The contingent of the Hungarian army was not to exceed 30 thousand people. Hungary was left without access to the sea. The control of the victors was established over the Danube. About 70% of the territory and almost half of the population seceded from Hungary.

This is how the post-war Versailles system developed.

Results of the Versailles Peace.

Historians of diplomacy have sometimes compared the Versailles Conference to the Congress of Vienna. Indeed, there are many superficial similarities between both conferences. The Versailles Conference lasted as long as the Congress of Vienna. Just as in Vienna, at Versailles they danced a lot and moved slowly forward. Conference sessions were often interrupted by reports of revolutionary outbreaks in Europe. The very tasks of the League of Nations approached those of the Holy Alliance: they boiled down to the protection of the new system international relations from the revolution.

But in essence, the Treaty of Versailles most of all resembled that of Frankfurt. The words spoken by Marx about Frankfurt are quite suitable for Versailles: “This is the surest way to turn ... war into European institution... This is an unmistakable way to turn the future world into a simple truce ... ".

Indeed, the Treaty of Versailles for a long time fixed the contradictions between the winners and the vanquished. He caused a huge movement of the population, before which the great migrations of peoples pale. Romania evicted more than 300 thousand people from Bessarabia. Almost 500 thousand people moved from Macedonia and Dobrudjin. The Germans left Upper Silesia. Hundreds of thousands of Hungarians were resettled from territories that had passed to Romania, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. Seven and a half million Ukrainians were divided between Poland, Romania and Czechoslovakia.

As a result of the Treaty of Versailles, the Slavic peoples were separated by a deep abyss. Poland, as an outpost of France in the east, was to serve as a springboard for an attack on Russia. The subsequent expansion of the borders of Poland at the expense of Ukrainian and Belarusian lands was laid at the basis of the Treaty of Versailles, the entire system of which was aimed at pushing the Slavic peoples among themselves. Transcarpathian Ukraine was given to Czechoslovakia, despite the decision of the people, adopted on December 18, 1918, to reunite with the rest of Ukraine. Bukovina, contrary to the decision of the "People's Council" November 3, 1918 to join the Soviet Ukraine, was given to Romania. Seeds of enmity were also sown between Poland and Czechoslovakia. Yugoslavia, which united the Slavic tribes in the south of central Europe, did not receive some parts of Slovenia given to Italy or left to Austria after the plebiscite. In addition, the guardians of the Versailles system put Yugoslavia in hostile relations with Russia for many years. Such were the consequences of the Treaty of Versailles for the Slavic peoples.

The Entente rallied against itself the defeated and aroused their hatred. On the other hand, disagreements within the Entente itself did not allow it to create strong guarantees against German revenge. Each of the winners negotiated with Germany without the knowledge of the partners and set her against the allies. There is no doubt that the terms of the Treaty of Versailles were difficult. But the whole burden of it was laid not on the German imperialists, but on the German people. The German imperialists retained their entire industry and could easily restore its productive capacity to the full extent. No one has yet forgotten with what fabulous speed France, after its defeat, paid the Germans a 5 billion indemnity; but in the half century separating Versailles from Frankfurt, technology has stepped far forward.

The German army was not completely crushed. Its staff survived. The Entente itself helped save it. Counting on a clash between Germany and Soviet Russia, the Entente turned a blind eye to the creation by the Germans of hundreds of military and sports organizations, where many tens of thousands of officers were hiding under the guise of instructors and hunters. In addition, Germany was spared from occupation.

Imperialist Germany, for its part, made extensive use of the strife among its opponents. Negotiating first with one, now with the other, deceiving everyone, the German imperialists were building up strength for a new offensive. Truly a prophecy were the words of Lenin: the Treaty of Versailles “is the greatest blow that the capitalists and imperialists of the victorious countries could inflict on themselves ».

As a result of the war and Versailles, the contradictions between the allies deepened even more. The struggle between England and France, the USA and England, the USA and Japan, and finally between Italy and the leading powers of the Entente, intensified. All this was accompanied by fundamental contradictions between the two systems - capitalism and socialism. The Treaty of Versailles was supposed to end the war. In reality, he turned her into a constant threat hanging over the whole world.